People v. Fountain
2016 IL App (1st) 131474
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Defendant Timothy Fountain was convicted by a jury of two counts of murder and one count of armed robbery for a 2005 double homicide and robbery at Maggy’s Food Store; sentenced to natural life plus 30 years concurrently.
- Key evidence: (1) eyewitness Brandon Grzesiak identified Fountain as the man at a bus stop and on store surveillance video; (2) partial DNA profile from victim Guerrero’s left‑hand fingernail clippings yielded a minor male profile that State experts concluded could not exclude Fountain; (3) historical cell‑site analysis placed Fountain’s cell phone in the general area of the store around the time of the crimes; (4) a lottery ticket number (5157) recovered at the scene led investigators to an address previously associated with Fountain.
- Days before trial (October 2012) the State disclosed revised ISP DNA reports that differed in their locus calls from earlier reports (2006–2007), prompting defense requests for a continuance to analyze the new reports and consult experts.
- The trial court granted a one‑day continuance (the only continuance defense requested), denied a Frye hearing on historical cell‑site analysis, and admitted FBI Agent Raschke’s cell‑site testimony; defense cross‑examined State DNA experts and presented a defense DNA expert who criticized State interpretations.
- On appeal Fountain raised multiple claims: trial‑court abuse in denying a meaningful continuance for new DNA reports, ineffective assistance of counsel, need for a Frye hearing on cell‑site analysis, lack of foundation for the cell‑site testimony, prejudicial witness testimony about “criminal histories,” and improper prosecutorial rebuttal. The majority affirmed; Justice Hyman dissented on the continuance/DNA issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Fountain) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continuance for late DNA reports | One‑day continuance was reasonable; defense had prior notice of flaws and ample time to prepare for testimony | State’s revised DNA reports days before trial required a meaningful continuance (weeks) to analyze and retain experts; one day was inadequate and prejudicial | Denied abuse of discretion; one‑day continuance sufficient and defense was not prejudiced |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel re: DNA | Counsel reasonably used cross‑examination and defense expert rather than move to exclude or seek a database search; trial strategy was sound | Counsel should have moved to exclude partial DNA or sought a database search; failure was deficient and prejudicial | No ineffective assistance; counsel’s attacks and expert testimony constituted a reasonable strategy and no reasonable probability of different outcome |
| Frye / admissibility of historical cell‑site analysis | Method is generally accepted and not novel; Frye hearing unnecessary | Cell‑site analysis is novel and required Frye review | Frye hearing not required; historical cell‑site analysis not novel and has been widely accepted |
| Foundation for cell‑site testimony & weight | Raschke adequately explained cell/tower interaction and call detail records; shortcomings go to weight not admissibility | Raschke failed to quantify tower ranges or do confirmatory testing; inadequate foundation for testimony that phone was "at or near" Maggy’s | Admissible: Raschke provided sufficient foundation; Rule 705 means details can be probed on cross‑examination; issues affect weight |
| Witness’s "criminal histories" remark | Brief, promptly stricken, and investigatory steps explaining how ID developed were relevant; any error harmless given overall evidence | Testimony suggested prior crimes and was prejudicial other‑crimes evidence requiring reversal | Stricken remark did not prejudice defendant; admission was harmless in context of substantial evidence |
| Prosecutor rebuttal (conspiracy comment) | Rebuttal fairly responded to defense attack that many agencies conspired to frame defendant; invited comment and not a burden‑shifting misstatement | Prosecutor improperly suggested jury must find a frame‑up to acquit, shifting burden and requiring reversal | No reversible error: remarks were invited, did not shift burden, and evidence was not closely balanced |
Key Cases Cited
- Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishes general‑acceptance test for novel scientific evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113 (2009) (factors for continuance abuse‑of‑discretion review)
- People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305 (1995) (prejudice from denial of continuance may require reversal)
- People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194 (2004) (ineffective assistance review and harmless‑error discussion)
- People v. Lott, 66 Ill. 2d 290 (1977) (continuance and right to defend analysis)
- People v. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d 90 (1993) (harmlessness of certain trial admissions)
- People v. Banks, 237 Ill. 2d 154 (2010) (limits on improper burden‑shifting arguments in closing)