People v. Foster
251 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312
Cal.2019Background
- Jeremy John Foster was convicted of felony grand theft (entered guilty plea) and served a prison term; after release he was civilly committed as a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) as a parole condition in 2010 and thereafter recommitted annually.
- Proposition 47 (2014) permitted redesignation of certain felonies as misdemeanors and provided that a redesignated conviction "shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes" (Pen. Code § 1170.18(k)).
- In 2016 Foster successfully petitioned to redesignate his prior felony grand theft as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.
- After redesignation Foster moved to dismiss his continued MDO recommitment, arguing the underlying felony no longer existed to support initial commitment or subsequent recommitments.
- Trial court denied relief; the Court of Appeal affirmed relying on reasoning that recommitment criteria focus on present mental disorder and dangerousness, not the current felony/misdemeanor status of the original conviction.
- The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Court of Appeal, holding redesignation did not invalidate Foster’s initial commitment or bar recommitment under the statutory scheme.
Issues
| Issue | Foster's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Proposition 47 redesignation to misdemeanor eliminates basis for past valid initial MDO commitment | Foster: §1170.18(k) makes his conviction a misdemeanor "for all purposes," so initial commitment lacks a qualifying felony and must be vacated | State: Initial commitment was valid when made; redesignation does not retroactively invalidate that commitment under MDO statutes and retroactivity principles | Held: Redesignation does not undermine validity of an initial MDO commitment made when a qualifying felony existed; no relief granted |
| Whether redesignation prevents recommitment under §§2966/2972 | Foster: If underlying felony is now a misdemeanor he cannot be recommitted because qualifying offense no longer exists | State: Recommitment criteria are the three dynamic factors (severe mental disorder, not in remission, dangerousness) and do not depend on present felony status | Held: Recommitment governed solely by dynamic factors; redesignation does not bar recommitment |
| Whether equal protection (analogy to SVP cases) requires treating MDOs like SVPs when underlying conviction is reversed/reduced | Foster: Under Smith/Bevill/Franklin, absence of qualifying felony should preclude continued civil commitment; similar treatment required | State: Those SVP precedents arose where conviction was reversed or was invalid at time of commitment or where statute structure differed; facts differ here because conviction was valid when initial commitment occurred | Held: No equal protection violation; SVP cases distinguishable and do not compel relief for Foster |
| Whether due process forbids recommitment based solely on diagnosis and predicted dangerousness after redesignation | Foster: Continued confinement after felony-to-misdemeanor redesignation violates due process | State: Recommitment follows valid initial commitment and present findings of disorder and dangerousness; no separate due process defect shown | Held: Court rejects due process challenge; no argument showing present recommitment violates due process when initial commitment was valid |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Harrison, 57 Cal.4th 1211 (describing MDO Act and statutory criteria)
- Lopez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.4th 1055 (distinguishing static/foundational and dynamic criteria for MDO commitment)
- In re C.B., 6 Cal.5th 118 (different standards govern initial obligations and later consequences after Proposition 47 redesignation)
- People v. Buycks, 5 Cal.5th 857 (construing §1170.18(k) retroactivity and applying Estrada principles)
- In re Smith, 42 Cal.4th 1251 (SVP commitment requires valid qualifying conviction when proceedings continue)
- Bevill v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d 854 (invalid conviction undermined commitment under the statute at issue)
- People v. Pipkin, 27 Cal.App.5th 1146 (distinguishing cases where initial commitment was improper from cases where it was valid)