People v. Fort
2017 IL 118966
| Ill. | 2018Background
- Cameron Fort, 16 at the time, was indicted on multiple counts including four counts of first-degree murder; because murder is listed in the Juvenile Court Act’s automatic-transfer provision, he was tried in adult court.
- After a bench trial, the court found the State proved first-degree murder elements but also found an unreasonable belief in self-defense as a mitigating factor and reduced the conviction to second-degree murder (an offense the State never charged separately).
- No written motion by the State requesting adult sentencing under the juvenile statute’s nonautomatic-sentencing provision was filed; the trial court nevertheless sentenced Fort as an adult to 18 years’ imprisonment.
- Fort did not object to adult sentencing at trial; the appellate court affirmed, holding mandatory adult sentencing applied despite the second-degree conviction.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and considered (a) whether sentencing Fort as an adult was authorized when he was convicted only of an uncharged non-automatic-transfer offense, and (b) whether the error could be reviewed despite forfeiture (plain-error doctrine).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Fort) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant could be sentenced as an adult after being convicted only of second-degree murder (uncharged) | Second-degree murder is a mitigated variant of first-degree murder and is therefore “covered by” the automatic-transfer offense; adult sentencing under §5-130(1)(c)(i) applies. | A conviction for an uncharged, non-automatic-transfer offense (second-degree murder) is not “covered by” §5-130(1)(a); absent a written State motion under §5-130(1)(c)(ii), juvenile sentencing procedures must apply. | Held for Fort: second-degree murder (uncharged) was not a charge arising out of the same incident for purposes of §5-130(1)(c)(i); adult sentence vacated and remanded so State may seek a §5-130(1)(c)(ii) hearing. |
| Whether the claimed statutory error could be reviewed despite forfeiture | Error was not plain because the law was not clearly established to require reversal. | The imposition of an unauthorized adult sentence implicates substantial rights and is plain error under the second prong (affects fairness/integrity). | Held for Fort: sentence was unauthorized and reviewable as plain error. |
| Proper remedy when State did not request adult sentencing within statutory timeline | Not separately argued beyond defending sentence. | Remand for vacatur of adult sentence and allow State to file the written motion within 10 days for adult sentencing hearing per statute; if denied, discharge because defendant is over 21. | Held: remand with directions to vacate sentence and allow State to file the §5-130(1)(c)(ii) motion within 10 days; if adult sentencing denied, proceedings should be discharged given age. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. King, 241 Ill. 2d 374 (Ill. 2011) (held that an offense arising out of the same incident as a §5-130 listed offense can be “covered by” the statute for adult sentencing where the other charge was itself charged)
- People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53 (Ill. 2008) (discusses charging second-degree murder separately from and without charging first-degree murder)
- People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104 (Ill. 1995) (explains reduction from first-degree to second-degree murder: State must prove first-degree elements and defendant must prove a mitigating factor)
- People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (Ill. 2005) (sets forth Illinois plain-error doctrine and its two-prong framework)
- People v. Blue, 207 Ill. 2d 542 (Ill. 2003) (discusses collateral estoppel and double jeopardy principles relevant when an offense is reduced at trial)