People v. Flores CA4/1
2 Cal. App. 5th 855
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Erik Flores (father) and Mariah Sugg (partner) lived with Flores’s three young children; children became severely malnourished and injured and were removed June 2014.
- Charges: multiple counts of torture (Pen. Code §206) and felony child abuse (§273a(a)) against both defendants for different time windows; enhancements for personally inflicting great bodily injury (§12022.7(d)).
- Jury convicted both defendants on all counts and found several §12022.7 personal-infliction allegations true. Each was sentenced to two life terms plus six years; some sentences were stayed.
- Flores appealed, arguing the jury was improperly instructed it could convict him of torture as an aider and abettor under the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine and that evidence was insufficient to show the required specific intent for torture.
- Sugg appealed, arguing §273a(a) is unconstitutionally vague as to the “willfully ... permits” language (relying on Heitzman), and alternatively that the court should have instructed the jury it could convict under the “permits” theory only if she had a duty to control the perpetrator.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether jury instruction allowing aider-and-abettor liability under the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine for torture was proper (Flores) | Natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine may apply to nontarget offenses that are reasonably foreseeable; instructing on aider-and-abettor liability was proper here. | Flores: Chiu limits natural-and-probable-consequences liability for offenses that hinge on a uniquely subjective mental state (Chiu re: first-degree premeditated murder); same logic should bar vicarious torture liability. | Court: Chiu is limited to first-degree murder; torture is more like second-degree murder (no degree split with uniquely subjective premeditation element). Instruction on natural-and-probable-consequences liability for torture was proper. |
| 2. Sufficiency of evidence to support torture convictions (specific intent and proscribed purpose) (Flores) | Sufficient circumstantial and medical evidence show extreme pain from prolonged starvation/beatings and a purpose (discipline/persuasion) supporting torture. | Flores: No direct evidence of intent to cause cruel/extreme pain or of the statutorily proscribed purposes (revenge, persuasion, extortion, sadistic purpose). | Court: Substantial evidence supported intent to cause cruel/extreme pain (emaciation, near-death, beatings) and that abuse was used as discipline/persuasion; convictions for torture affirmed. |
| 3. Facial vagueness of §273a’s "willfully ... permits" language (Sugg) | Statute, when properly construed (per Heitzman), is constitutional; the court can and should limit “permits” liability to persons with an affirmative duty to control the actor. | Sugg: §273a is vague because it can criminalize mere bystanders who had no duty to prevent abuse; Heitzman requires a narrowing construction. | Court: Adopts Heitzman’s limiting construction: the “willfully permits” prong is limited to persons who had an affirmative duty (statutory/common law) to control the actor; §273a is constitutional as so construed. |
| 4. Whether trial court erred by not sua sponte instructing jury that a "permits" conviction requires a duty to control (Sugg) and whether any error was harmless | Jury should have been instructed (sua sponte) that to convict under the "permits" theory the jury must find Sugg had a duty to control the perpetrator; omission prejudicial. | Trial court not obliged to give that instruction because evidence supported alternate, proper theories (Sugg as direct perpetrator or as caretaker); any instructional gap was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | Court: No sua sponte duty arose because evidence and prosecution theory showed Sugg was a direct perpetrator and/or caretaker; even if error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (jury also found she personally inflicted great bodily injury). |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014) (limits natural-and-probable-consequences liability for offenses requiring a uniquely subjective mens rea such as first-degree premeditated murder)
- People v. Heitzman, 9 Cal.4th 189 (1994) (statute criminalizing permitting abuse must be construed to apply only to persons with an affirmative duty to control/stop the actor)
- People v. Valdez, 27 Cal.4th 778 (2002) (interpreting §273a and distinguishing active versus passive/permitting liability and applicable mens rea)
- People v. Knoller, 41 Cal.4th 139 (2007) (discusses rationale for holding accomplices liable for serious harms as natural and probable consequences)
Disposition: Judgment affirmed as modified; remanded to correct minute orders/abstracts to reflect life terms on specified counts for each defendant.