People v. Flinner
10 Cal.5th 686
| Cal. | 2020Background
- Defendant Michael Flinner was convicted of first-degree murder, lying-in-wait and financial-gain special circumstances, conspiracy, grand theft, poisoning (mingling harmful substance), and solicitation; a jury returned a death verdict and the trial court sentenced him to death. The conviction followed a joint trial with codefendant Haron Ontiveros tried before a separate jury (dual-jury procedure).
- Victim Tamra Keck was summoned to meet Ontiveros, went to a cul-de-sac, and was shot in the back of the head while leaning over her car hood; surveillance video, phone records, and other circumstantial evidence placed Flinner and Ontiveros together near the scene shortly before the killing.
- Prosecution presented evidence of Flinner’s motive (large life insurance policy listing Flinner as beneficiary, financial distress), consciousness-of-guilt acts (attempts to frame others, threats, attempts to obtain jurors’/witnesses’ addresses, threats toward prosecutor), and inculpatory statements (to friends/inmates). Defense advanced alternate theories and attacked witness credibility and foundation for physical and documentary evidence.
- Pretrial security measures (transfer to a remote jail facility, restricted calls/visits) were imposed after jail informant disclosures that Flinner sought to obtain addresses of witnesses, the judge, and the prosecutor; defense objected to inconvenience but did not assert constitutional right-to-counsel/due-process claims below.
- At trial the court admitted various items (anonymous letters, jail letters, a voicemail, bullets with names) on relevance/authentication grounds; the court admitted portions of Ontiveros’s custodial statements against Flinner as statements against interest but later (post-verdict) concluded admission contravened Crawford and found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Flinner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pretrial detention and restrictions on counsel access | Security-based relocation and restrictions were legitimate responses to jailhouse informant disclosures; no trial-rights prejudice shown | Move to remote jail, restricted phone/visits and ex parte proceedings violated due process and right to counsel; judge/prosecutor bias | Forfeiture of constitutional objections; merits rejected — no prejudice shown and court acted within discretion (claims denied) |
| Severance / dual-jury procedure and antagonistic defenses | Joint trial with dual juries appropriate; dual juries avoid Bruton problems and are efficient | Antagonistic defenses (Flinner denies vs Ontiveros blames Flinner) and Ontiveros’s confession required severance | Denial of severance not an abuse; dual juries appropriate and antagonism was not irreconcilable given independent evidence against Flinner |
| Admission of codefendant Ontiveros’s custodial statements (Confrontation Clause) | Selected redacted portions were admissible as statements against interest and cumulative; any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Introduction of Ontiveros’s testimonial statements via detective violated Crawford and Flinner’s confrontation rights | Court agreed Crawford error occurred but ruled the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because independent evidence was overwhelming (no new trial) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for lying-in-wait special circumstance and first-degree murder | Evidence (surveillance, phone records, crime-scene forensics, conduct) established concealment, watching/waiting, surprise attack, and intent | Three minutes at the scene insufficient to show substantial watching/waiting or position-of-advantage; special circumstance unconstitutional as applied | Sufficient evidence supported lying-in-wait and special circumstance; Proposition 18 challenge rejected (Johnson precedent upheld) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (limiting instruction insufficient where a nontestifying codefendant’s confession facially incriminates defendant)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (admission of testimonial hearsay violates Confrontation Clause absent unavailability and prior cross-examination)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (forensic or testimonial statements treated as witnesses for Sixth Amendment purposes)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard)
- People v. Johnson, 62 Cal.4th 600 (upholding constitutionality of amended lying-in-wait special circumstance under Prop. 18)
- People v. Daveggio & Michaud, 4 Cal.5th 790 (severance standard and review of antagonistic defenses)
- People v. Lewis, 43 Cal.4th 415 (Bruton/Crawford interaction and redaction analysis)