People v. Flemming
31 N.E.3d 935
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Defendant Ron Flemming was charged with murder (two first-degree counts) for the February 17, 2010 stabbing death of Steve Nabry and with attempted first-degree murder / aggravated battery for injuries to Gerald Gushiniere; bench trial resulted in convictions for second-degree murder and aggravated battery and a 20-year sentence on murder.
- Eyewitnesses Gushiniere and Yolanda McElroy testified that Flemming returned to a third-floor apartment armed and immediately attacked and stabbed Nabry; Gushiniere also testified he was stabbed multiple times and required hospital treatment.
- Flemming testified he returned unarmed to retrieve McElroy, was attacked by Nabry and Gushiniere (who he said had poles/weapons), and stabbed Nabry in self-defense after a struggle for a knife.
- The trial court credited the State’s witnesses over Flemming, found Flemming the aggressor, rejected his self-defense claim, convicted him of second-degree murder (finding a mitigating factor) and aggravated battery, but did not enter judgment or sentence on the aggravated battery count.
- After conviction, Flemming made a pro se Krankel claim of ineffective assistance; the trial court conducted a brief inquiry in which the prosecutor questioned trial counsel; the court denied the motion, finding counsel credible and strategy-based decisions reasonable. The appellate court affirmed convictions but—on reconsideration in light of People v. Jolly—remanded for a new preliminary Krankel inquiry and for sentencing on the aggravated battery count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Flemming) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for second-degree murder / whether State disproved self-defense | State proved first-degree murder and disproved self-defense; any reduction to second degree was based on a mitigating factor proven by defendant | Flemming argued witnesses were incredible/inconsistent and State failed to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt | Affirmed: viewing evidence in State’s favor, a rational trier could find Flemming was aggressor, self-defense unreasonable; second-degree murder conviction stands because defendant proved a mitigating factor by preponderance |
| Aggravated battery conviction (and whether lesser-included of attempted murder) | Evidence showed battery with a deadly weapon (knife), meeting aggravated battery under subsection (b)(1); indictment alleging "stabbed" Gushiniere supplies main outline of that lesser offense | Flemming argued State failed to prove great bodily harm and aggravated battery is not a lesser-included of attempted murder as charged | Affirmed: evidence supports aggravated battery under (b)(1) (deadly weapon) so conviction stands; remanded for entry of judgment and sentencing on that count |
| Adequacy of Krankel (pro se ineffective assistance) inquiry and State’s role | State asked limited questions of trial counsel at court’s direction; participation was de minimis and inquiry was preliminary | Flemming argued the questioning by the prosecutor turned the inquiry adversarial and denied him counsel to contest counsel’s testimony | Reversed as to Krankel procedure: under People v. Jolly, State’s questioning rebutting defendant’s pro se allegations rendered the preliminary inquiry improperly adversarial; remand for new preliminary Krankel inquiry before a different judge without State’s adversarial participation |
| Remand for sentencing on aggravated battery | N/A | N/A | Remanded: appellate court directs sentencing entry for aggravated battery and new preliminary Krankel hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill.2d 104 (Ill. 1995) (defendant bears burden to present some evidence of each element of self-defense; State must then disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt)
- People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (Ill. 1984) (trial court must inquire into pro se ineffective-assistance claims and, if allegations show possible neglect, appoint new counsel for the claim)
- People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142 (Ill. 2014) (preliminary Krankel inquiry must be neutral; State’s adversarial participation that rebuts defendant’s claims at the preliminary stage requires reversal and remand for a new neutral inquiry)
- People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68 (Ill. 2003) (describes the two-step Krankel process and standards for initial inquiry)
- People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d 274 (Ill. 2004) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence and credibility determinations)
- People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill.2d 209 (Ill. 2001) (factfinder resolves witness credibility when versions conflict)