People v. Fleming
14 N.E.3d 509
Ill. App. Ct.2014Background
- On July 1, 2009, Riley Fleming and codefendant Brandon Myers arrived together in a gray Ford; an attempted armed robbery and shooting at two victims (Thomas and Pendleton) occurred near Maypole Avenue; Fleming wore a red shirt and Myers wore a black shirt and mask.
- After the incidents, the same Ford ran a red light; police pursued, the occupants fled on foot, Myers fired at officers and was shot; Fleming was later found hiding under a vehicle and detained.
- The State charged Fleming and Myers together in case 1 (armed robbery of Thomas; attempted armed robbery of Pendleton; aggravated discharge of a firearm at Pendleton). Separately, the State charged Myers alone in case 2 (attempted murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm against police officers).
- The State moved to join case 2 with case 1; the trial court granted joinder and tried both defendants and the charges to a single jury.
- The jury convicted Fleming of aggravated discharge of a firearm and attempted armed robbery (accountability for Myers’s conduct) but acquitted him of the armed robbery of Thomas; Fleming received an enhanced Class X sentence and a three-year mandatory supervised release (MSR) term.
- Fleming appealed, arguing (1) improper joinder prejudiced him, (2) insufficiency of evidence for accountability, and (3) MSR should be two years (Class 1), not three (Class X).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was joinder of Fleming’s case with Myers’s separate police-shooting case proper? | State: yes—both sets of offenses were part of one comprehensive transaction (same time, place, motive, method, and common evidence). | Fleming: joinder was prejudicial because he wasn’t charged in case 2 and had exited before the shooting; jury could be unfairly influenced by the more serious charges against Myers. | Joinder proper; trial court did not abuse discretion; offenses were temporally/physically related and part of a common transaction. |
| Was Fleming’s conviction on an accountability theory supported by sufficient evidence? | State: yes—eyewitnesses and flight, joint arrival/exit from car, joint flight, and concealment support common design and shared intent. | Fleming: evidence showed only presence and flight; no proof he knew Myers was armed or intended to rob/shoot; mere presence insufficient. | Evidence sufficient: common design and shared intent reasonably inferred; accountability upheld. |
| Did joinder produce plain or reversible error despite forfeiture? | State: no—no abuse and jury was properly instructed to consider charges separately; any error not plain. | Fleming: raised plain-error review claiming substantial prejudice. | No plain error—no abuse of discretion and no substantial prejudice shown. |
| Was Fleming’s three-year MSR term improper because underlying convictions are Class 1? | State: three-year MSR required where defendant is sentenced as Class X under statutory enhancement. | Fleming: MSR should be the term attached to the underlying Class 1 offenses, citing Pullen. | Three-year MSR affirmed—controlling precedent holds enhanced Class X status requires three-year MSR. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307 (accountability: shared intent or common criminal design)
- Quiroz v. People, 257 Ill. App. 3d 576 (linking separate acts as part of an escape/common transaction)
- Evans v. People, 87 Ill. 2d 77 (presence/assistance and limits on accountability)
- Taylor v. People, 164 Ill. 2d 131 (factors for accountability; presence, flight, association)
- Pullen v. People, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (treatment of enhanced Class X sentencing provisions)