People v. Fillyaw, 123 N.E.3d 113

In June 2007 two armed men entered Lasondra Shaw’s apartment; Shaw was killed and Lebraun Graham and Ernest Hughes were shot.
Defendants William Fillyaw and Johnny Parker were retried after this court ordered a new trial; at retrial Graham and Yetta Little were unavailable and their first-trial testimony was read to the juries.
At the first trial Graham positively identified Fillyaw and Parker as the shooters; before retrial Graham signed a notarized affidavit recanting the identification, claiming police influence.
Trial court excluded Graham’s recanting affidavit (citing an incorrect date on the affidavit and concerns about reliability/foundation) but admitted Graham’s prior testimony; defendants sought to use the affidavit to impeach under Ill. R. Evid. 806 and to authenticate it under Ill. R. Evid. 901.
Juries convicted both defendants of first‑degree murder and two counts of attempted murder; defendants appealed, challenging sufficiency of evidence, exclusion of the recantation, admission of prior consistent statements, and other evidentiary rulings.
The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Graham’s affidavit for impeachment under Rules 806 and 901 and that the error was not harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence against Parker	Evidence (Graham/Rodgers IDs, cell phone, jacket) supports conviction	IDs were unreliable and internally inconsistent; psychiatric/medication and delay undermine IDs	Evidence was sufficient; a rational jury could convict viewing evidence in prosecution's favor
Admissibility of Graham’s recanting affidavit (Rule 806 / authentication)	Affidavit unreliable, foundation lacking, wrong date; state argued authentication and reliability problems	Affidavit was admissible to impeach under Rule 806; notary testimony provided a rational basis for authentication under Rule 901	Trial court abused discretion in excluding affidavit; affidavit should have been admitted for impeachment and reliability was for jury to weigh; reversal and remand ordered
Admission of Rodgers’s prior consistent statements	Statements corroborated officers and were admissible	Statements were classic bolstering; no exception proved (not to rebut fabrication/motive)	Admission was erroneous; prior consistent statements improperly used as substantive corroboration
Phone call referencing a $10 million bond (recorded jail call)	Phone call admissible; court redacted bond references but prosecution emphasized bond amount in closing	References to $10 million bond were irrelevant and prejudicial contrary to court order	References to bond amount were irrelevant and inadmissible; if repeated on remand should be excluded

People v. Fillyaw, 409 Ill. App. 3d 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (prior opinion discussing the case facts and eyewitness issues)
Blackston v. Rapelje, 780 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2015) (recantations are prototypical impeachment material; skepticism over recantation reliability is for the jury)
People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419 (Ill. 2000) (Jackson sufficiency standard reaffirmed)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1975) (witness’s inconsistent statements bear on credibility and bias)
People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 354 (Ill. 1991) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
People v. Downin, 357 Ill. App. 3d 193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (authentication under Rule 901; admissibility presents jury question)
Hartness v. Ruzich, 155 Ill. App. 3d 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (definition and treatment of circumstantial evidence)
People v. Grathler, 368 Ill. App. 3d 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (use of corroborating circumstantial evidence to support identifications)