People v. Field
204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 548
Cal. Ct. App.2016Background
- Martin Field, a 63-year-old with a long history of sexual offenses against children, was tried under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) and the jury found him an SVP; he was committed to a state hospital.
- Prosecution experts diagnosed pedophilic disorder and opined Field was likely to reoffend; defense expert also diagnosed pedophilic disorder but concluded Field was not likely to reoffend (differing Static-99R scores).
- Field raised multiple claims on appeal: jury instruction errors (need for a pinpoint instruction and meaning of "likely"), prejudicial use of the term "sexually violent predator," cumulative error, constitutional challenges to the SVPA, and that calling him as a prosecution witness violated equal protection (arguing parity with NGI detainees).
- The trial court denied a requested pinpoint instruction about "serious difficulty controlling behavior," gave CALCRIM No. 3454 (with minor word variations), and adopted a modified definition of "likely" ("much more than a mere possibility").
- The Court of Appeal rejected most claims (instructions, term usage, cumulative error, SVPA constitutionality claims) but held the equal protection claim about compelling SVP testimony raised a substantial question and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to allow the People to justify differential treatment between SVP's and NGI's regarding testimonial privilege.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Field) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred by refusing requested pinpoint instruction that diagnosis must cause "serious difficulty" controlling behavior | CALCRIM No. 3454 already encompasses required lack-of-control element; no additional instruction needed | Crane requires explicit finding/instruction that disorder causes serious difficulty in control; refusal was reversible error | Denied; court followed People v. Williams — CALCRIM No. 3454 adequate, no reversible error |
| Whether jury was properly instructed on meaning of "likely" | Modified CALCRIM language ("much more than a mere possibility") tracked precedent and was adequate | Instruction was confusing/incomprehensible and prejudicial | Denied; instruction adequate and consistent with Ghilotti/Roberge definitions |
| Whether repeated use of term "sexually violent predator" was unduly inflammatory and violative of due process | Term is the statutory label the jury must apply; its use was appropriate | Term is gratuitously ominous and prejudicial; its repeated use denied due process | Denied; use appropriate given statutory context and undisputed facts about Field's history |
| Whether compelling Field to testify violated equal protection (parity with NGI/MDO statutory testimonial privilege) | SVP's and NGI's are not similarly situated for testimonial privilege or, if they are, rational basis suffices | SVP's are similarly situated to NGI's re: testimonial privilege; compelling testimony violates equal protection absent compelling justification | Remanded for evidentiary hearing: court concluded SVP's and NGI's are similarly situated for this issue and strict scrutiny applies; People must justify disparate treatment |
Key Cases Cited
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (U.S. 2002) (due process limits on civil commitment require mental disorder affecting control)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1997) (SVP civil-commitment framework and punishment inquiry)
- People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757 (Cal. 2003) (CALCRIM instruction on lack-of-control not constitutionally required beyond SVPA text)
- People v. McKee, 47 Cal.4th 1172 (Cal. 2010) (SVPA constitutional challenges; remand for justification of disparate treatment)
- People v. McKee, 207 Cal.App.4th 1325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (post-remand evidentiary hearing and justification for disparate treatment upheld)
- Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1138 (Cal. 1999) (SVPA overview and constitutional analysis)
- People v. Roberge, 29 Cal.4th 979 (Cal. 2003) (definition of "likely" under SVPA)
- Ghilotti v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 888 (Cal. 2002) (definition of "likely" and substantial danger standard)
- Hudec v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.4th 815 (Cal. 2015) (statutory testimonial privilege for NGI detainees)
- People v. Curlee, 237 Cal.App.4th 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (SVP and NGI similarly situated for testimonial-privilege equal protection claim)