2021 IL App (1st) 201072-U
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- In July 1998 Chris Stubblefield was fatally shot during an armed robbery; over a month later police arrested Darrell Fair and he gave an oral inculpatory statement that was reduced to a handwritten statement he refused to sign.
- Fair later alleged police abuse at Area 2: a short white detective in cowboy boots (identified later as Detective McDermott) kicked him in the shin, threatened him with a gun, denied sleep, food, asthma medication, and access to counsel, and coerced his statements.
- Fair filed a torture claim with the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission; the Commission found the claim credible and referred it to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.
- At the hearing Fair testified consistently that he was kicked; he introduced documentary evidence of prior misconduct allegations against McDermott. The State called only Assistant State’s Attorney Mebane (who prepared the handwritten statement) and submitted documentary exhibits.
- The circuit court found Fair not credible on key points, ruled Fair failed to meet his initial burden that new evidence would likely have led to suppression, and alternatively found the State proved the statements were voluntary.
- The appellate court affirmed: it accepted Fair’s unrebutted allegation that McDermott kicked him but concluded the post-kick statements (given the totality of circumstances) were not the product of torture and were voluntary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Fair) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fair met the initial burden to show new evidence (prior misconduct by McDermott) would likely have led to suppression of his statement | Fair: prior allegations against McDermott and his consistent account would have changed a suppression hearing result | State: prior allegations not sufficiently similar or probative; Fair’s identification and story were inconsistent and not credibly tied to McDermott | Court: Fair’s allegation he was kicked was accepted as true, but he still failed to show the new evidence would likely have led to suppression |
| Whether the State met its burden to prove Fair’s statement was voluntary by a preponderance | Fair: his will was overborne by kicking, deprivation (sleep, food, meds), and denial of counsel | State: totality of circumstances (Miranda warnings, assistance of ASA Mebane, facts of interview) support voluntariness; ASA’s testimony credible | Court: State met its burden; the oral/handwritten statement was voluntary and not product of torture |
| Whether the State’s failure to call material witnesses (Detectives McDermott, Porter, Przepiora) required adverse inference or defeat of voluntariness proof | Fair: absence of those officers’ testimony left coercion unrebutted | State: not required to call every material witness so long as it proves voluntariness | Court: no adverse inference; prosecution may meet its burden without calling all material witnesses (R.D. controls) |
| Whether repeated invocation of right to counsel required suppression under the Torture Act | Fair: he repeatedly asked for a lawyer but was questioned anyway, so statements were invalid | State: Torture Act requires showing statements were product of torture; deprivation of counsel alone under these facts did not make statement product of torture | Court: denial of counsel claims do not, by themselves under the Torture Act, entitle Fair to relief; State proved statements were not the product of torture |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93 (2000) (factors for admissibility/relevance of prior-misconduct evidence to show pattern or practice)
- Jackson v. People, 2021 IL 124818 (2021) ("strikingly similar" language in Patterson is descriptive, not a strict test; look for sufficient similarity)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and custodial interrogation safeguards)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (post-invocation rule regarding cessation of interrogation after request for counsel)
- People v. R.D., 155 Ill. 2d 122 (1993) (prosecution not required to call all material witnesses to prove voluntariness)
- People v. Kincaid, 87 Ill. 2d 107 (1981) (a person whose will is overborne will not typically resist confessing and yet later calibrate resistance such as refusing to sign)