People v. Evans
2017 IL App (1st) 143562
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 1996, 17-year-old Angelo Evans was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to consecutive extended terms totaling 90 years (60 + 30), with the trial court finding no mitigating factors related to youth.
- Under Illinois sentencing rules applicable to Evans, he is eligible for day-for-day good-conduct credit, making him eligible for release after serving 45 years (around age 62).
- Evans previously raised sentencing challenges on direct appeal and in earlier postconviction petitions; those efforts were unsuccessful.
- In 2014 Evans sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition arguing his 90-year sentence is an unconstitutional (de facto) life sentence for a juvenile under recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Roper/Graham/Miller/Montgomery);
- The trial court denied leave, concluding that Evans could not show the required prejudice because his sentence does not constitute a life-without-parole or de facto life-without-parole sentence under Miller and Reyes.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding Miller and its progeny do not apply because Evans’s sentence allows for release via good-conduct credit and is not an obligatory de facto life-without-parole term.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether leave to file a successive postconviction petition should be granted to assert an Eighth Amendment Miller-based challenge to a juvenile sentence | Evans: 90-year term imposed for offenses committed at 17 is effectively life without parole and Miller protections apply | State/Trial Ct: Evans is eligible for release after day-for-day credit (about 45 years); not a life-without-parole or mandatory de facto life sentence, so Miller does not apply | Denied: Evans failed to show prejudice; Miller/Montgomery do not apply to his sentence |
| Whether a 45-year actual term-of-years (after good-time credit) qualifies as "de facto" life sentence for Eighth Amendment purposes | Evans: even 45 years is de facto life because he is unlikely to survive or have a productive life after release | State: courts should not speculate about individual life expectancy; Reyes requires an "unsurvivable" term or mandatory de facto life; 45 years differs from prior de facto life holdings | Denied: court refuses to engage in actuarial speculation; 45-year effective term not de facto life here |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders unconstitutional; sentencing must allow consideration of youth)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rule made retroactive; states may cure Miller violations by allowing parole eligibility)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (Ill. 2016) (vacating an "unsurvivable" mandatory term-of-years as a de facto life-without-parole sentence under Miller)