People v. Evans
2017 IL App (4th) 140672
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- In July 2013, Officer Kyle Harrold approached Charles Evans, who was walking near a reported burglary; Harrold asked questions and Evans repeatedly put his hands in his pockets despite requests to keep them visible.
- Harrold, alone, was smaller than Evans, knew Evans had come from a house linked to narcotics trafficking, and was in a high-narcotics area late at night.
- After repeated requests, Harrold performed a frisk (pat-down) and felt a smoking pipe; he handcuffed Evans, then, during a struggle and with backup, recovered a baggie containing cocaine.
- Evans was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia; he filed a pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence arguing the stop and search were unlawful.
- The trial court denied the motion, finding the initial encounter was consensual but the frisk was a permissible Terry frisk based on reasonable suspicion that Evans was armed and dangerous; Evans was convicted and sentenced to probation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the initial contact was a seizure | State: Initial contact was consensual (no seizure) | Evans: He was seized when officer approached or when asked to remove hands | Court: Initial contact was consensual; no seizure until the frisk |
| Whether officer could frisk during a consensual encounter | State: Officer may frisk if he develops reasonable suspicion that person is armed/dangerous | Evans: Frisk required reasonable suspicion of criminal activity too; here absent | Court: Officer may frisk in consensual encounter upon reasonable suspicion person is armed and dangerous; no separate reasonable-suspicion-of-crime required |
| Whether Harrold had reasonable suspicion to frisk Evans | State: Facts (late hour, narcotics area, size disparity, repeated pocketing of hands, source house) justified concern for officer safety | Evans: Factors like placing hands in pockets and nervousness alone do not create reasonable suspicion | Court: Totality of circumstances gave objectively reasonable suspicion Evans might be armed; frisk justified |
| Scope of the frisk | State: Frisk was within Terry scope | Evans: Alleged frisk exceeded Terry scope (raised on appeal) | Court: Issue forfeited for lack of preservation; no record evidence that frisk exceeded Terry scope |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes authority for brief investigatory stops and protective frisks)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (reasonable-person test for seizure; Mendenhall factors)
- Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (addresses seizure analysis where movement is independently restrained)
- People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835 (Ill. 2013) (Illinois Supreme Court: during consensual encounters officers may frisk when they develop reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous)
- People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (Ill. 2006) (framework for distinguishing consensual encounters, Terry stops, and arrests)
- People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103 (Ill. 2001) (attempted roadblock as seizure if person submits to show of authority)
- People v. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (initial police questioning is consensual; seizure analysis when officer demands removal of hands)