People v. Estrada
220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801
| Cal. | 2017Background
- In 1996 Mario Estrada pleaded guilty to grand theft from a person (Pen. Code §487(c)) and, under a plea agreement, the prosecution dismissed related robbery and firearm-use counts and alleged firearm enhancement; he was sentenced to 25 years to life as a third-strike offender.
- Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012) created a resentencing mechanism (Pen. Code §1170.126) allowing some third-strike inmates convicted of nonserious, nonviolent felonies to seek recall of sentence, but excludes inmates who, "during the commission of the current offense," were armed with a firearm or deadly weapon (§1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iii)).
- Estrada filed a recall petition; the trial court reviewed his 1996 preliminary hearing transcript (where a Radio Shack employee testified Estrada pulled a handgun and demanded money) and found it "more likely than not" Estrada was armed during the theft, and denied the petition as ineligible under Prop 36.
- Estrada appealed, arguing the court impermissibly relied on facts underlying dismissed counts (robbery and firearm-use allegation) and that doing so undermined his plea agreement; the Court of Appeal affirmed and the California Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court held that a recall court may consider facts in the record of conviction beyond those explicitly recited in the judgment, and may rely on facts underlying dismissed counts so long as those facts also pertain to and show conduct "during the commission" of the offense of conviction; it affirmed the denial of Estrada’s petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a trial court consider facts beyond the judgment when deciding Prop 36 eligibility under §1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iii)? | AG: Yes; court may consider record of conviction and other evidence showing conduct during the offense. | Estrada: No; inquiry should be limited to facts encompassed by the judgment/plea. | Court: Yes; statute contemplates reviewing record to determine if disqualifying conduct occurred "during the commission" of the offense. |
| May a court rely on facts underlying counts dismissed by plea when those facts also relate to the offense of conviction? | AG: Yes; dismissed counts' underlying facts may be considered if they show disqualifying conduct during the convicted offense. | Estrada: No; relying on dismissed-count facts effectively resurrects bargained-for dismissals and violates plea agreement. | Court: Yes, provided those facts also underlie the offense of conviction and the plea agreement does not expressly bar such consideration. |
| Does considering dismissed-count facts violate the defendant's plea agreement or due process? | AG: No; plea bargains dismissing counts do not ordinarily immunize associated factual findings from later collateral inquiries. | Estrada: Yes; it denies the benefit of the plea and rewrites the agreement. | Court: No; plea agreements only bind the parties to the terms actually negotiated; absent an express negotiated immunity, courts may consider such facts. |
| Should the Court of Appeal's contrary authority (People v. Berry) control here? | AG: Berry was wrongly decided to the extent it bars consideration of dismissed-count facts showing arming during the convicted offense. | Estrada: Relies on Berry to argue dismissal blocks adverse consequences from underlying facts. | Court: Disapproved Berry to the extent it holds courts cannot consider dismissed-count facts demonstrating arming during the offense. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Conley, 63 Cal.4th 646 (discussing Proposition 36 purposes)
- People v. Johnson, 61 Cal.4th 674 (interpreting Prop. 36's prospective plead-and-prove and comparability statements)
- People v. Villalobos, 54 Cal.4th 177 (plea-agreement scope and what terms are binding)
- People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal.3d 343 (examining record of prior conviction for enhancement purposes)
- People v. Bland, 10 Cal.4th 991 (interpretation of "in the commission" and nexus requirement)
- Williams v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 337 (statutory interpretation against constructions that render language useless)
- People v. Berry, 235 Cal.App.4th 1417 (disapproved to the extent it barred reliance on dismissed-count facts showing arming during the offense)