People v. Espinoza
1 Cal. 5th 61
| Cal. | 2016Background
- Defendant Zeferino Espinoza was charged with multiple felonies and misdemeanors arising from a 2009 incident (guns, ammunition, drugs, criminal threats, witness-dissuasion). He is a convicted felon.
- Over ~27 months the public defender office appointed seven different attorneys; the case trailed repeatedly and defense repeatedly sought continuances and made Marsden motions.
- On the day jury selection began (April 24, 2012) Espinoza moved repeatedly to represent himself (Faretta); the court gave detailed Faretta warnings, conditioned self-representation on his ability to proceed immediately, and granted the motion after colloquy.
- Trial began: jury empaneled, prosecution opened, first witness called; Espinoza (pro se) participated minimally and then failed to appear the next day. Court attempted to locate him, found his absence voluntary under Penal Code §1043(b)(2), and continued trial in his absence without reappointing counsel.
- Jury returned a mixed verdict (guilty on weapons/drug counts; acquitted on threats/witness-dissuasion). Espinoza later moved for a new trial and appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed on grounds that proceeding without counsel and denying a one-day continuance after Faretta were errors. California Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court could continue trial in defendant's absence after he waived counsel and then failed to appear | People: Section 1043(b)(2) permits continuation where defendant voluntarily absents himself; substantial evidence supports finding of voluntary absence and waiver of presence | Espinoza: He did not knowingly waive right to be present; record lacks on-the-record warning he would lose presence-right if absent; proceeding without counsel was structural error | Court: Affirmed trial court discretion to continue under §1043(b)(2); Espinoza implicitly waived presence by voluntarily absenting himself after valid Faretta waiver; no abuse of discretion in proceeding without reappointing counsel |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying a one-day continuance after granting Faretta | People: Court conditioned Faretta grant on defendant's ability to proceed immediately; defendant had been told no extended continuances and court reasonably believed defendant already had discovery | Espinoza: He needed one day to obtain materials from public defender; denial prejudiced his ability to prepare | Court: No abuse of discretion — Faretta grant was conditioned on immediate readiness; court reasonably denied the requested one-day continuance |
| Whether the court implicitly revoked pro se status (for misconduct) and thus had to reappoint counsel | People: No; record shows court did not terminate self-representation and had no obligation to thrust counsel on unwilling defendant; appellant forfeited new theory | Espinoza: Court implicitly revoked pro se status after his disappearance and should have reappointed counsel; also claims mental incompetence for self-representation | Court: Claims forfeited and meritless on record; court did not implicitly revoke Faretta waiver and had no reason to doubt competency |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (a defendant has the right to represent himself but understands risks and consequences)
- Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (a defendant who voluntarily absents himself after trial has begun may have waived the right to be present; courts may proceed)
- Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (majority rule that voluntary absence after trial begins operates as waiver of right to be present)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on court or standby counsel interfering with a pro se defendant’s control over presentation)
- People v. Concepcion, 45 Cal.4th 77 (2008) (waiver of right to be present may be implied; standard of review for voluntary absence)
- People v. Gutierrez, 29 Cal.4th 1196 (2003) (discusses §1043 and the totality-of-the-circumstances test for voluntary absence)
- People v. Clark, 3 Cal.4th 41 (1992) (midtrial Faretta motions may be denied if continuance required)
- People v. Parento, 235 Cal.App.3d 1378 (1991) (proceeding with trial after defendant elects self-representation and then absents himself was proper)
- Cureton v. United States, 396 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir.) (precedent on voluntary absence awareness standard cited with approval in Taylor)