2018 IL 122059
Ill.2018Background
- Theophil Encalado was tried for multiple counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault; the trial focused on six counts involving victim Y.C.; other-crimes evidence as to two additional victims (C.C., S.A.) was admitted; defendant had a prior predatory sexual assault conviction.
- At trial the State presented DNA and eyewitness identification tying Encalado to assaults; C.C.’s assault was linked by DNA; Y.C. identified Encalado in photo and physical lineups.
- Encalado testified and asserted the encounters were consensual exchanges for money/drugs (i.e., prostitution), claiming he later tried to take back payments; he admitted prior conviction but denied forcible assault.
- Before trial defense counsel asked the court to question the venire whether evidence the defendant had patronized prostitutes would prevent them from being fair; the trial court refused, ruling the question improperly commented on specific evidence.
- The jury convicted Encalado on three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault; the appellate court reversed, finding the refusal to ask the prostitution-bias question an abuse of discretion and remanding for a new trial.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and reversed the appellate court, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the proposed voir dire question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Encalado) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask venire whether evidence defendant patronized prostitutes would prevent fair consideration | Denial was proper; voir dire need not include the proffered question because it would ask jurors to comment on specific evidence and the court’s general voir dire sufficed | Jurors might harbor bias against patrons of prostitutes; questioning was necessary to uncover bias and secure impartial jury | No abuse of discretion; refusal did not render voir dire fundamentally unfair — question would have preargued a disputed fact and no legal authority shows patronage of prostitutes produces the type of juror bias requiring specific inquiry |
| Whether voir dire must probe bias about facts that are disputed at trial (i.e., whether victims were prostitutes) | Trial court’s general questions about impartiality and ability to follow instructions were adequate; specific factual questioning is impermissible when it pre-argues disputed facts | Needed to reveal bias relevant to credibility and fairness, similar to required questioning about gang membership in Strain | Specific voir dire about disputed factual matters is generally disallowed; unlike gang membership (an undisputed, central theme in Strain), prostitution here was contested and not an established area of juror-specific prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408 (establishes voir dire purpose to detect juror bias)
- Strain v. People, 194 Ill. 2d 467 (Illinois 2000) (when prejudicial, pervasive gang evidence requires specific voir dire about gang bias)
- Cloutier v. People, 156 Ill. 2d 483 (voir dire aims to find jurors whose minds are closed by bias)
- Peeples v. People, 155 Ill. 2d 422 (racial issues require voir dire only when inextricably bound to trial)
- Lobb v. People, 17 Ill. 2d 287 (voir dire permitted to ascertain juror bias)
- Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (voir dire on race required only where race is central to the trial)
- Mapp v. People, 283 Ill. App. 3d 979 (prohibits voir dire that functions as a preliminary final argument)
- Bowel v. People, 111 Ill. 2d 58 (questions designed to educate jurors on defense theory are generally prohibited)
