People v. Encalado, 73 N.E.3d 562

In 2006 Y.C. reported she was raped; DNA from a 2006 vaginal swab later matched Theophil Encalado. He was charged with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault.
The State was allowed to introduce evidence of similar assaults against C.C. and S.A.; evidence concerning a 2002 offense against J.H. was excluded as too dissimilar.
Before trial the State’s rape‑shield motion barred evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity and certain anal‑swab evidence; defense did not contest those rulings.
Encalado testified claiming both sex encounters with Y.C. and C.C. were consensual prostitution transactions; he admitted a prior predatory criminal sexual assault conviction.
The trial court permitted the State to impeach Encalado with that prior predatory‑assault conviction but refused defense requests to ask venire members whether hearing evidence of prostitution (or drug possession) would affect their impartiality.
Jury convicted on all counts; the appellate court affirmed admissibility of the prior conviction for impeachment but reversed and remanded because the court abused its discretion by denying the proposed voir dire question probing bias against prostitution.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach Encalado with a prior predatory criminal sexual assault conviction	The prior conviction was relevant to credibility in a case that turned on credibility and therefore admissible under Montgomery balancing	Admission was unduly prejudicial, particularly because of similarity to charged offenses	Affirmed — court did not abuse discretion; prior conviction admissible for impeachment given probative value on credibility (Montgomery factors applied)
Whether trial court erred by refusing to ask venire whether evidence of prostitution would prevent impartiality	No reversible error; voir dire scope is discretionary and court must avoid indoctrinating jurors or previewing evidence	Refusal prevented defense from uncovering bias against patrons of prostitutes and thus thwarted intelligent use of challenges; question was directly relevant to impartiality	Reversed — court abused discretion by denying a narrowly‑tailored voir dire question probing potential bias against persons who participate in prostitution; remand for new trial

People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510 (1971) (trial court balances probative value versus unfair prejudice when admitting prior convictions for impeachment)
People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill.2d 450 (1999) (appellate review of admission of prior convictions for impeachment and relevance to credibility)
People v. Redd, 135 Ill.2d 252 (1990) (trial court presumed to have considered Montgomery factors; similar prior convictions admitted sparingly)
People v. Strain, 194 Ill.2d 467 (2000) (voir dire is for uncovering juror bias affecting ability to apply law; scope rests in trial court’s discretion)
People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill.2d 159 (1990) (limits on confrontation and cross‑examination when prior sexual conduct is irrelevant; rape‑shield principles)
Lobb v. People, 17 Ill.2d 287 (1959) (voir dire must enable parties to discover juror bias that forms basis for challenge for cause)
People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719 (2012) (court explains continuum of permissible voir dire questioning; cautions against specific trial‑evidence‑style questions)
People v. Williams, 164 Ill.2d 1 (1994) (trial court has primary responsibility for conducting voir dire; scope within discretion)