People v. Duran, 84 Cal.App.5th 920

In 1984 Michael Duran, an El Monte Flores gang member, participated in a group assault during which James Torres was stabbed to death; Duran was convicted of second‑degree murder (aider/abettor theory) and sentenced to 15 years to life.
Duran filed a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition (formerly § 1170.95) in 2019 after statutory changes narrowed murder liability; the petition survived summary denial and an evidentiary hearing was held.
At the hearing the People introduced statements Duran gave in a January 2013 parole risk assessment interview, in which he described going to the scene, shouting things including “Now let’s kill these mother fuckers,” and participating in the melee.
Duran testified and denied intent to kill, claiming his shout was to the wind and that he did not form an intent to kill; he also had filed a sworn declaration asserting eligibility for § 1172.6 relief (i.e., he was not a direct aider/abettor).
The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Duran was a direct aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill (crediting trial witnesses that he aided in taking Torres down), denied the petition, and Duran appealed arguing (1) admission of the 2013 parole statements was barred by a judicially created “use immunity” doctrine and (2) the statements were involuntary under due process. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a judicially created "use immunity" (Coleman line) bars use of parole risk‑assessment statements at a § 1172.6 evidentiary hearing	The People argued Coleman is inapplicable; § 1172.6 hearings may consider prior or new admissible evidence and use immunity protects only where the Fifth Amendment privilege could be undermined; prior statements here were admissible and usable for impeachment.	Duran argued Coleman and its progeny should extend to bar use of statements made under parole‑related pressure because the defendant had little choice but to speak.	Court rejected extension of Coleman. Use immunity does not apply because the § 1172.6 hearing is not a subsequent retrial/sentencing that invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege and prior statements were admissible for impeachment.
Whether Duran’s 2013 parole interview statements were involuntary under the Due Process Clause	The People argued statements were voluntary: Duran was told participation was not required, the incentive to speak for parole consideration does not overbear will, and the content was not a full confession to the killing.	Duran argued the parole incentive made his statements involuntary/coerced and therefore inadmissible.	Court held statements were voluntary under the totality of circumstances: no official coercion, he was told he could decline, and the statement did not admit complicity in the killing; due process exclusion was not triggered.

People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867 (judicial use‑immunity rule for probation revocation testimony)
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (Fifth Amendment concerns when compelled to choose between rights at preliminary proceedings)
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (final conviction generally ends Fifth Amendment testimonial privilege)
Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. exception attaching use immunity on collateral review in some cases)
People v. Myles, 69 Cal.App.5th 688 (parole assessment statements admissible at § 1172.6 hearings)
People v. Anderson, 78 Cal.App.5th 81 (same conclusion re parole statements and Coleman)
People v. Mitchell, 81 Cal.App.5th 575 (same conclusion; discusses scope of Coleman and impeachment exception)
People v. Linton, 56 Cal.4th 1146 (definition and totality‑of‑circumstances test for involuntary confessions)