2019 IL App (4th) 190316
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- In May 2018 David E. Dunmire was charged with two counts of aggravated DUI and two counts of DUI after an officer stopped his vehicle on February 7, 2018, alleging illegally tinted side windows.
- Officer Ryan Crowder (on the scene) testified he could not see into the vehicle as it passed his parked squad car at night, so he initiated the stop for a suspected window-tint violation. He observed no other traffic offenses.
- Crowder had limited academy training on tint (daytime, stationary cars), had never used a tint meter in the field, and his department did not possess one. He also acknowledged some uncertainty about the statutory percentages for permissible tint.
- The trial court granted Dunmire’s motion to suppress, reasoning the stop was unlawful because the officer lacked a tint meter or other means to confirm the suspicion before stopping the car (a “confirmable suspicion” standard).
- The State appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding the trial court applied an incorrect standard and that Crowder’s inability to see into the vehicle could give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the stop justified at its inception (reasonable suspicion of illegal window tint)? | Crowder’s testimony that he could not see into the vehicle gave reasonable, articulable suspicion of a tint violation. | Officer lacked required training/tools to distinguish legal vs illegal tint at night; his observation was insufficient. | Reversed: the totality of circumstances (could not see into car at night) provided reasonable suspicion. |
| Could the trial court require an officer to have a tint meter or other means to confirm the violation before stopping? | No; an officer need not have a method to conclusively prove a violation before initiating a Terry stop. | Yes; without a meter the stop was speculative and therefore unlawful. | Trial court erred; requiring pre-stop confirmation is improper. |
| Does an officer’s mistake of law about tint percentages invalidate reasonable suspicion? | Reasonable, objectively supportable mistakes of law are tolerated (Heien). | The statute is unambiguous, so any legal mistake is unreasonable and fatal to suspicion. | Mistakes of law may be permissible if objectively reasonable and facts support suspicion. |
| Does a pretextual motive defeat the stop? | Pretext is permissible so long as an objective basis (reasonable suspicion) exists. | The stop was a pretext because officer knew he could not investigate the alleged violation. | Pretext does not invalidate a stop if objective justification existed at inception. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes investigative stop standard)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (reasonable mistakes of law may support Fourth Amendment stops)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (pretextual stops permissible when objective basis exists)
- People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388 (officer’s training and experience inform probable-cause/reasonableness analysis)
- People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223 (objective test for reasonable mistake of law)
- People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835 (stop must be justified at its inception; specific and articulable facts required)
- People v. Hagen, 191 Ill. App. 3d 265 (purpose of tint prohibition is officer safety; visibility standard)
- People v. Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d 539 (fact-specific inquiry on visibility/obstruction; importance of articulable facts)