People v. Drew, G052949

Background

Victim Amber Oceja, a severely diabetic 29-year-old, was in appellant Charles Drew’s motel room in a diabetic coma; Drew knew she needed insulin and often cared for her.
While Oceja was unconscious, Drew sexually assaulted her; autopsy showed severe genital trauma inflicted within two hours of death.
Oceja died of acute diabetic ketoacidosis; experts agreed the sexual assaults did not materially cause the coma or directly accelerate death.
Drew did not summon medical assistance after Oceja became incapacitated; evidence showed emergency treatment could likely have saved her.
Drew was charged with four felony sex crimes on an unconscious person, assault with a deadly weapon, first degree felony murder, and a felony-murder special circumstance; jury convicted and trial court sentenced him to life without parole.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence supports first-degree felony murder given the causal link between sex crimes and death	Drew’s omission (failing to call for help) was a substantial factor and logically connected to the death, satisfying felony-murder causation	The sex offenses did not cause the diabetic ketoacidosis; death was solely from natural disease, so felony-murder causal link lacking	Affirmed — omission was a substantial factor and met logical nexus and continuous-transaction requirements for felony murder
Whether felony murder can be predicated on an omission (failure to act)	Felony murder may extend to omissions when the felony and omission are logically connected and the defendant’s conduct substantially contributed to death	An omission-based death should at most support second-degree implied-malice murder; first-degree felony murder cannot be based on failure to act	Affirmed — California’s felony-murder statute permits application where the death results from defendant’s omission tied to the felony
Whether appellant was legally responsible for death despite victim’s prior failure to take insulin	Even if diabetes was a preexisting cause, Drew’s control, knowledge, and failure to summon aid made him legally responsible	Victim’s own failures (not taking insulin, declining help) and her comorbid substance use make Drew not the legal cause	Affirmed — jury reasonably found Drew’s omission was a substantial contributing cause; victim’s conditions did not absolve him
Whether felony-murder special circumstance requires proof the killing was committed to further the felony	Special circumstance requires independent felonious purpose but not proof the killing was intended to advance that purpose	Special circumstance must require that the killing was to advance the felony (narrowing required for death-penalty eligibility)	Affirmed — special circumstance requires an independent felonious purpose (here sexual gratification) but not proof the homicide was committed to advance that purpose; no constitutional defect shown

Key Cases Cited

People v. Catlin, 26 Cal.4th 81 (2001) (proximate-cause standard: an act/omission must be a substantial factor in causing death)
People v. Wilkins, 56 Cal.4th 333 (2013) (felony-murder requires logical nexus and temporal/continuous-transaction connection)
People v. Cavitt, 33 Cal.4th 187 (2004) (explaining felony-murder deterrent purpose and logical nexus concept)
People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574 (1966) (defendant’s interference with medical care can be proximate cause of death)
People v. Thompson, 50 Cal.3d 134 (1990) (continuous-transaction rule applies where defendant controlled victim until death)
People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal.3d 744 (1988) (prosecutor may rely on alternative theories based on same facts)
People v. Rountree, 56 Cal.4th 823 (2013) (special-circumstance doctrine: felony must be independent of killing but killing need not advance felony)
People v. Dement, 53 Cal.4th 1 (2011) (reaffirming limits and requirements for felony-murder special circumstance)
People v. Brown, 59 Cal.4th 86 (2014) (upholding felony-murder special-circumstance narrowing function under state law)