People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934

Background

Mark A. Downs was convicted of first‑degree murder by a jury in Kane County and sentenced to 70 years’ imprisonment.
During deliberations the jury asked for a definition of “reasonable doubt,” including whether it corresponded to percentages ("80%, 70%, 60%"), and the trial court replied: “We cannot give you a definition; it is your duty to define.”
The jury returned a guilty verdict. Posttrial, Downs filed pro se ineffective‑assistance claims under People v. Krankel; the trial court conducted the requisite inquiry and denied relief after remand proceedings.
On appeal, Downs argued for the first time that the trial court’s response to the jury’s question improperly defined reasonable doubt; the appellate court found plain error, vacated the conviction, and ordered a new trial.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding the trial court’s answer did not define reasonable doubt and did not create a reasonable likelihood that jurors convicted on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the Supreme Court reinstated the conviction and remanded for consideration of Downs’ remaining ineffective‑assistance claims.

Issues

Issue	State (Appellant) Argument	Downs (Appellee) Argument	Held
Whether the trial court’s response to a jury request for a definition of “reasonable doubt” constituted an erroneous definition permitting conviction on less than beyond a reasonable doubt	The court did not define reasonable doubt; it correctly refused to define it and merely told jurors it was for them to decide	The court’s reply, read with the jury’s percentage question, implicitly authorized a numeric (e.g., 60–80%) standard and thus created a substantial likelihood of conviction on less than beyond a reasonable doubt	Trial court’s response was correct; no clear or obvious error in refusing to define reasonable doubt; conviction reinstated
Whether the jury’s percentage question ("80%, 70%, 60%") transforms the trial court’s refusal to define into reversible error	Focus should be on the trial court’s response, not speculative inferences about jurors’ deliberations; one cannot reliably divine deliberative processes from the question	The percentage phrasing shows jurors were predisposed to a lower standard and the court’s laissez‑faire response compounded the error	The Court declined to infer juror misunderstanding from the question; the phrasing did not make the court’s refusal erroneous
Whether the plain‑error doctrine saves this unpreserved instructional claim	Procedural default generally applies; but plain error may be invoked in exceptional cases; here no clear error occurred	Downs invoked plain error to obtain review despite forfeiture	Plain‑error review was not warranted because there was no clear or obvious error; the forfeiture is honored

Key Cases Cited

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (due‑process violation only if jury instruction leaves a reasonable likelihood jurors convicted on less than beyond a reasonable doubt)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (defective reasonable‑doubt instruction requires reversal when it reduces constitutionally required burden)
People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365 (1992) (Illinois precedent proscribing definitions of reasonable doubt)
People v. Cagle, 41 Ill. 2d 528 (1968) (‘‘reasonable doubt’’ needs no definition)
People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d 52 (1958) (same)
People v. Moses, 288 Ill. 281 (1919) (same principle)
People v. Lee, 368 Ill. 410 (1938) (same principle)
People v. Davis, 406 Ill. 215 (1950) (error to elaborate reasonable doubt)
People v. Barkas, 255 Ill. 516 (1912) (‘‘reasonable doubt’’ is self‑defining)
United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1988) (warning that attempts to define reasonable doubt risk harm without real benefit)
United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to supply jury‑specific definitions absent a universally acceptable definition)