People v. Dowdell
227 Cal. App. 4th 1388
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- On April 13–14, 2009 Terrance Lincoln (36) and Brittany Dowdell (20, pregnant) participated in a robbery/carjacking/kidnapping of victim Benjamin Toma; Derric Shavens (immunity) drove and testified for the prosecution. Lincoln displayed a gun (he later claimed it was a painted toy), restrained Toma, demanded money, and forced ATM attempts at multiple banks. Lincoln made post‑crime phone calls to Toma traced to his phone.
- Both were charged with kidnapping (for extortion), kidnapping during a carjacking, carjacking, and kidnapping for robbery; Lincoln also faced a criminal threats count and alleged priors. Dual juries were used; Lincoln was convicted on five counts, Dowdell on two (jury hung on two counts for Dowdell).
- Lincoln gave a recorded statement admitting involvement; he later recanted at trial. Dowdell also gave a recorded statement and testified she followed Lincoln’s orders, presenting evidence and expert testimony on intimate partner battering (IPB).
- Sentencing: Lincoln received concurrent life terms (with parole possible) and additional years; the court stayed one kidnapping count under Penal Code § 654 and imposed other terms. Dowdell was sentenced to life (with parole possibility); the court orally stayed one count under § 654 but the abstract misrecorded it.
- On appeal the court (1) found Lincoln’s custodial statement admissible (but would have been harmless if excluded), (2) accepted AG concession that carjacking is a lesser included of kidnapping during a carjacking and struck that conviction, (3) held one of Lincoln’s life terms must be stayed under § 654, (4) found the trial court erred in limiting IPB evidence for Dowdell but that error was harmless, and (5) ordered correction of Dowdell’s abstract to reflect the stayed sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntariness of Lincoln’s confession | Police did not coerce; statements to Lincoln about helping Dowdell were not controlling | Lincoln: officers made implied promises of leniency for Dowdell (pregnant), overbore his will so statement involuntary | Court: officers made implied promises but Lincoln was experienced, calm, understood limits; statement voluntary. Even if error, admission harmless beyond reasonable doubt |
| Prosecutor’s “The presumption of innocence is over” (Lincoln) | Prosecutor’s rhetoric was permissible to argue weight of evidence | Lincoln: misstatement of law; trial counsel ineffective for failing to object | Court: misstatement of law; claim forfeited for lack of objection; no ineffective assistance because no prejudice given overwhelming evidence |
| Mid‑trial motion to relieve retained counsel (Lincoln) | Lincoln: Ortiz standard requires relief for irreconcilable conflict; structural error if denied | Prosecution: motion untimely and would disrupt trial; trial court properly balanced interests | Court: applied appropriate discretion; motion untimely and denial not abuse of discretion; no reversible structural error |
| Section 654 — multiple kidnapping convictions (Lincoln) | Lincoln: Counts One and Two arose from one continuous transaction to obtain money; one sentence should be stayed | People: movement of vehicle and subsequent acts could support separate offenses | Court: Lincoln’s sole objective was money; stay one life term (Count Two stayed) |
| Lesser‑included offense — carjacking vs. kidnapping during carjacking (Lincoln) | Lincoln: carjacking conviction duplicative of kidnapping during carjacking | People conceded carjacking is necessarily included | Court: accepted concession; struck carjacking conviction |
| Jury instruction on IPB and specific intent (Dowdell) | Dowdell: court should have allowed IPB evidence to bear on specific intent (per Coffman) | People: limiting instruction (to duress/self‑defense) sufficed; no reversal | Court: error to limit use of IPB evidence only to duress; but error harmless under Watson standard (not Chapman) given evidence contra intent |
| Prosecutor comment about probation (Dowdell) | Dowdell: remark injected leniency into jurors’ minds, prejudiced defense | People: prompt admonition cured any harm; evidence strong | Court: any misconduct harmless given admonition and strong evidence |
| Abstract of judgment (Dowdell) | Dowdell: abstract incorrectly recorded Count Four as concurrent, not stayed | People: AG concedes clerical error | Court: order correction to reflect oral stay |
Key Cases Cited
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (coercive police activity is prerequisite to finding confession involuntary under Due Process)
- Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (confession involuntary if will overborne by threats or promises)
- People v. Boyde, 46 Cal.3d 212 (1988) (express or clearly implied promises of leniency render confession involuntary)
- People v. Steger, 16 Cal.3d 539 (1976) (threat or promise affecting a relative can invalidate confession)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (constitutional error reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- People v. Panah, 35 Cal.4th 395 (2005) (prosecutorial remarks reviewed for reasonable likelihood of juror misapplication; forfeiture principles)
- People v. Ortiz, 51 Cal.3d 975 (1990) (standard for relieving retained counsel and balancing disruption against defendant’s choice)
- Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11 (1960) (section 654 protects against multiple punishments for single intent/transaction)
- People v. Coffman & Marlow, 34 Cal.4th 1 (2004) (IPB evidence may be considered on specific intent and mental‑state issues)
- People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal.4th 1073 (1996) (instructional error re IPB addressed under Watson; not every exclusion of defense evidence requires Chapman review)
- People v. Jones, 75 Cal.App.4th 616 (1999) (carjacking is necessarily included in kidnapping during a carjacking)
- People v. Contreras, 55 Cal.App.4th 760 (1997) (discusses elements and relation of carjacking and kidnapping during carjacking)