People v. Dorsey
2021 IL 123010
| Ill. | 2021Background
- In 1996, 14-year-old Derrell Dorsey entered a Chicago takeout and shot four people, killing a 16-year-old and seriously injuring two others; he was convicted in 1998 of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder.
- The trial court imposed consecutive terms: 40 years (murder) + 18 + 18 = 76 years aggregate.
- Because Dorsey was sentenced before Illinois’s later truth-in-sentencing changes, he is eligible for statutory day‑for‑day good‑conduct credit, which the State estimates would reduce his effective time to about 38 years (earliest scheduled release Sept. 20, 2034).
- Dorsey filed a successive postconviction petition invoking Miller v. Alabama and related Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, arguing his aggregate term was a de facto life sentence; lower courts denied leave to file.
- The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed whether statutory good‑conduct credit is relevant to the Miller/de facto‑life inquiry and whether a juvenile sentence that permits release after 40 years or less (accounting for credit) is an unconstitutional de facto life term. The Court affirmed denial of leave to file, holding good‑conduct credit is relevant and Dorsey’s sentence did not amount to a de facto life sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dorsey) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relevance of day‑for‑day good‑conduct credit in determining whether a juvenile term is a de facto life sentence under Miller/Buffer | Good‑conduct credit is speculative and conditional; courts should examine the court‑imposed term (76 years) at the pleading stage, making it a de facto life sentence (>40 years) | The sentencing scheme must be considered in full; mandatory statutory good‑conduct credit gives a meaningful opportunity for release and thus is relevant | Good‑conduct credit is relevant; where statutory scheme affords release after 40 years or less, the sentence is not a de facto life term (affirmed) |
| Whether Dorsey satisfied cause and prejudice to file a successive postconviction petition based on Miller | Miller was decided after Dorsey’s initial petition (cause); his sentence is a de facto life sentence (prejudice) | Concedes cause but contends no prejudice because Dorsey’s effective term (with credit) allows release in 38 years | Cause satisfied; prejudice not established because statutory good‑conduct credit provides meaningful opportunity for release before >40 years (affirmed) |
| Effect of Montgomery/Jones on Miller obligations for discretionary life or de facto life terms | Miller protections should apply where a juvenile’s term is functionally equivalent to life | Jones confirms no additional formal factfinding is required; consideration of youth need only be possible | Even apart from good‑time credit, Jones supports outcome: discretionary sentencing with ability to consider youth satisfies Miller principles |
| State‑law proportionate‑penalties claim (Ill. Const. art. I, §11) | Dorsey alternatively argued 76‑year term shocks the moral sense and fails to focus on rehabilitation | State argued the claim was forfeited and barred by res judicata | Claim deemed forfeited and precluded by res judicata; Court declined to address on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (forbids mandatory life without parole for juveniles; sentencing must account for youth and attendant characteristics)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes must have a meaningful opportunity for release based on maturity/rehabilitation)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (U.S. 2016) (Miller applies retroactively; States may remedy Miller violations by allowing parole consideration)
- Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (U.S. 2021) (no formal factfinding of permanent incorrigibility required; discretionary sentencing that permits consideration of youth satisfies Eighth Amendment)
- People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (Ill. 2019) (Illinois Court drew a >40‑year line to identify de facto life sentences for juvenile offenders absent opportunity for earlier release)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (Ill. 2016) (term‑of‑years that in effect requires incarceration beyond life expectancy is the functional equivalent of life without parole)
- People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102 (Ill. 2014) (considered earliest statutory release opportunity when assessing whether juvenile term equates to life without parole)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Ill. 2017) (discussed application of Miller/Montgomery to discretionary life sentences)