People v. Dillard
8 Cal. App. 5th 657
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Defendant Joseph Dillard was arrested after driving a 16‑year‑old to meet an undercover officer; charged with human trafficking of a minor (Pen. Code §236.1(c)).
- He surrendered after a bench warrant, retained counsel, and entered an open no‑contest plea accepting a suspended eight‑year term and three years probation (including one year county jail) instead of the prosecutor’s 5‑year prison offer.
- Defendant signed a plea form acknowledging lifetime sex‑offender registration (§290) and that probation would include reasonable related conditions; he later claimed trial counsel failed to advise him of mandatory sex‑offender management program requirements under §1203.067(b).
- New counsel moved to withdraw the plea, arguing Bunnell advisement was required for §1203.067(b) conditions (polygraph, waiver of psychotherapist‑patient privilege, etc.); former counsel testified he warned about §290 registration and possible probation restrictions but not the specific §1203.067 mandatory program details.
- The trial court denied the motion, finding (1) defendant had been adequately informed about §290 and probation risks, (2) §1203.067(b) program conditions are not direct consequences of the plea (probation is discretionary), and (3) defendant failed to show prejudice or lack of voluntariness; court sentenced defendant to probation with the §1203.067 program and internet/residency restrictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Dillard) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1203.067(b) sex‑offender program conditions are "direct consequences" requiring pre‑plea Bunnell advisement | Not a direct consequence because probation (and its conditions) are discretionary; §1203.067 is rehabilitative and not part of the penal range | §1203.067(b) imposes mandatory, immediately implementable consequences for any conviction requiring §290 registration and probation, so Bunnell advisement was required | Court held not a direct consequence: probation is optional and §1203.067 conditions are not a definite, automatic effect on the punishment range |
| Whether defendant established prejudice from any failure to advise under Bunnell | Defendant did not prove a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea given the 5‑year prison exposure and likely cooperative victim | Failure to advise on §1203.067 prejudiced Dillard; he would not have pled if informed of polygraph, privilege waivers, internet/residency limits | Court held defendant failed to show prejudice; credibility findings favored counsel and prosecution’s offer made plea likely regardless |
| Whether trial counsel’s assistance was constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise on §1203.067 details | Counsel’s performance was reasonable; he discussed §290, reviewed plea form, and pursued a probation deal to avoid prison | Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate defenses and for inaccurate/misleading advice about consequences | Court held no Strickland deficiency: counsel reasonably advised, investigated, and defendant has no showing he would have insisted on trial |
| Whether trial court erred by conflating standards (clear & convincing vs. reasonable probability) in denying withdrawal | Any conflation did not affect outcome because defendant failed the reasonable probability prejudice test | Court applied wrong standard prejudicially | Court found no reversible error; record shows defendant failed to establish prejudice under the correct standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Bunnell v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 592 (judicial rule requires advising defendants of direct consequences of plea)
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (constitutional requirement that pleas be voluntary and intelligent)
- People v. Moore, 69 Cal.App.4th 626 (definition of direct consequences: definite, immediate, largely automatic effect on punishment)
- People v. Goulart, 224 Cal.App.3d 71 (probation is leniency and its conditions are not necessarily penal consequences)
- People v. Zaidi, 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 (distinguishing public registration under §290 from confidential rehabilitation programs)
- In re Moser, 6 Cal.4th 342 (prejudice standard for withdrawing plea for inadequate advisement)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal.4th 924 (prejudice standard when counsel’s advice leads to a guilty plea)