People v. DiCorpo
177 N.E.3d 1095
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- In 1997 two 17-year-olds, Dino DiCorpo and Daniel Henney, set a fire that killed six children; each was convicted of first‑degree murder, aggravated arson (ordered to run consecutively), and burglary. At original sentencing each received natural life for murder plus a consecutive 30‑year arson term and concurrent burglary term.
- Postconviction petitions granted under Miller v. Alabama led to joint resentencing proceedings in 2017; the trial court stated at the outset it would resentence on both murder and aggravated arson but later announced it would only revisit the murder sentence and left the aggravated arson sentence "standing."
- The trial court resentenced DiCorpo to 60 years and Henney to 50 years on the murder counts; with the consecutive 30‑year arson term the resulting aggregate terms were 90 and 80 years, respectively. Defendants moved to reconsider, arguing the court should have resentenced the aggregate terms.
- The State argued defendants forfeited any claim about aggregate resentencing by not objecting earlier; the court found the issue preserved and reviewed under harmless‑error principles.
- Appellate court held the trial court erred by failing to resentence the aggregate sentences arising from a single course of conduct, that the error was not harmless, and remanded for resentencing before a different judge promptly in light of intervening caselaw (including holdings that >40 years can be de facto life for juveniles).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Forfeiture: Did defendants forfeit objection to aggregate resentencing? | Forfeited for failure to object at sentencing. | Preserved by oral objections and written motions to reconsider after the court announced it would not resentencing the aggregate. | Preserved; appellate review applies and harmless‑error standard governs. |
| Scope of resentencing: Must court resentence aggregate term when offenses arose from one course of conduct? | Resentencing limited to the natural‑life murder sentence only. | Miller and Reyes require consideration of the aggregate sentence when offenses arise from a single course of conduct. | Court must consider and, if appropriate, resentence the aggregate sentence. |
| Harmless error: Was failure to resentence aggregate harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? | Harmless because the court effectively set non‑life murder terms and defendants could serve the arson term concurrently or would be released earlier. | Not harmless: court expressly treated only murder as at issue and the preserved aggregate yields a de facto life term. | Not harmless; State failed to show the court would have reached same result; remand required. |
| Remand procedure: Should resentencing occur before a different judge and promptly? | No special transfer required. | New judge appropriate given evolving juvenile‑sentencing jurisprudence and trial judge’s expressed views; speedy resentencing needed (Henney’s 30‑yr term nearly served). | Remand for resentencing before a different circuit judge and order prompt scheduling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (juvenile rede termination requires consideration of aggregate sentence from single course of conduct)
- People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (sentence greater than 40 years for juvenile constitutes a de facto life sentence)
- People v. Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308 (an 80‑year term with only the possibility of 50% credit is a de facto life sentence)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (before imposing life or de facto life on a juvenile, court must find permanent incorrigibility)
- People v. Mahomes, 2020 IL App (1st) 170895 (vacating juvenile’s aggregate sentence and remanding for resentencing)