People v. DeVaughn CA4/2
175 Cal.Rptr.3d 270
Cal. Ct. App.2014Background
- Three defendants (Michael DeVaughn, Anthony DeVaughn, Stepfon Macey) were tried together for an extensive real‑estate identity‑theft and money‑laundering scheme involving forged loan documents, fake escrow operations, and funneling loan proceeds through shell entities and out‑of‑state bank accounts. Michael orchestrated the scheme; Anthony operated shell companies and businesses that received funds; Macey participated in document signing and received payments.
- Jury convictions: Michael — multiple counts including identity theft, money laundering, recording false documents, operating unlicensed escrow, grand theft, and elder abuse; Anthony — multiple money‑laundering convictions; Macey — money laundering and weapons/ammunition possession counts.
- Sentences: Michael ~33 years; Macey 14 years; Anthony ~3 years 4 months. Various enhancements were imposed.
- On appeal the People conceded several money‑laundering counts failed because the instruments involved were "personal checks" excluded from the statutory definition of "monetary instrument." The court reversed those convictions.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed many convictions, reversed others (several money‑laundering counts and an enhancement), stayed some sentences under Penal Code §654, ordered resentencing for Anthony and Macey, corrected Anthony's custody credits, and directed amendment of abstracts of judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether certain convictions for money laundering (counts 18,19,20,21,33) stand because the charged instruments were "monetary instruments" | The transactions (withdrawals, cashier's checks, deposits) involved financial institutions and thus satisfied the statutory element (transactions involving a monetary instrument) | Defendants argued the instruments were personal checks or otherwise excluded from the monetary‑instrument definition in §186.9(d) | Reversed convictions for those counts: People conceded and court held the personal‑check exclusions apply, requiring reversal |
| Whether money‑laundering counts based on out‑of‑state bank activity (Wachovia purchases in Alabama) could be sustained because the funds were later deposited in California banks | The People argued that depositing cashier's checks into California accounts satisfies the statute's requirement that the financial institution do business in California | Defendants argued the origination at an out‑of‑state Wachovia (no CA presence) cannot furnish the California financial‑institution element | Court accepted People’s theory that the depositing into California banks provided the California nexus and affirmed convictions as to counts tied to those California deposits |
| Whether multiple convictions under Financial Code §17200 (operating an escrow without a license) may be punished as discrete offenses vs. a single continuous course of conduct | People argued each unlawful escrow act (different loans/transactions) constituted separate violations that may be charged and punished separately | Michael argued §17200 targets ongoing unlicensed escrow business and cannot be split into discrete offenses for separate transactions | Court rejected defendant’s single‑offense theory and held separate acts involving different transactions may be charged separately; affirmed multiple §17200 convictions (but stayed some sentences under §654 where appropriate) |
| Whether Penal Code §12022.6(a)(2) enhancement (loss > $150,000) could be applied to a §115 (recording false document) conviction (count 10) | People applied the enhancement to reflect large cumulative loss from fraud connected to false recordings | Michael argued comparable authority (Frederick) limits applying a taking enhancement where the loss to the State or other victims is not part of the same common scheme or arises at a different time | The court reversed the enhancement finding as to count 10 (jury did not make the required special finding); enhancement vacated and sentence stricken as to that enhancement |
| Application of Penal Code §654 (single course of conduct) to multiple sentences arising from related identity‑theft/escrow/loan acts (numerous counts) | People argued many convictions involved separate victims, separate times, or separate objectives so §654 did not bar consecutive punishment | Defendants argued many counts were incidental steps to a single overall fraud objective and should be stayed under §654 | Court applied §654 in specific instances (stayed several §17200 counts tied to particular transactions and stayed some escrow counts); but affirmed consecutive sentences where substantial evidence supported separate objectives, victims, or temporal separability |
| Whether Anthony’s counsel was ineffective for not excluding evidence about guns, ammunition, and drugs found at a house and whether any deficiency prejudiced him | People argued the inflammatory evidence was minor relative to overwhelming financial‑fraud evidence and Anthony’s own admissions about moving stolen money made the verdict inevitable | Anthony argued counsel should have objected and that the evidence prejudiced his jury | Court found any failure to exclude that evidence not prejudicial given the overwhelming damning financial evidence and admissions; ineffective‑assistance claim rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Frederick v. Superior Court, 142 Cal.App.4th 400 (appellate court holding loss must arise from a common scheme or plan for certain enhancements to apply)
- Trevino v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.4th 237 (statutory interpretation principles)
- Flores v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.4th 1059 (use of extrinsic aids for ambiguous statutes)
- Latimer v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 1203 (section 654—indivisibility depends on actor's intent and objective)
- Andra v. Superior Court, 156 Cal.App.4th 638 (temporal separation and different victims defeat §654)
- Bauer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 368 (limits on multiple punishment for property offenses committed in a single transaction)
- Correa v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.4th 331 (purpose of §654 is proportional punishment)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)