People v. Destiny P. (In Re Destiny P.), 102 N.E.3d 149

Destiny P., age 14, was charged in juvenile court with first degree murder and related offenses; she was a first-time offender facing mandatory commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DOJJ) until age 21 if adjudicated.
The Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-101(3), 5-605(1)) provides that delinquency trials are by the court (bench trials) unless a statutory provision grants a jury; HJO and VJO provisions do grant jury trials for certain recidivist offenders.
Destiny moved for a jury trial, arguing (1) due process now requires jury trials for juveniles charged with first degree murder post-1998 reforms, and (2) equal protection is violated because similarly situated recidivist juveniles (HJO/VJO) receive jury trials while she does not.
The trial court denied the due process claim but upheld the equal protection claim, finding first-time murder defendants similarly situated to HJO/VJO juveniles because all face mandatory confinement and thus the statute was unconstitutional as applied.
The State appealed; Destiny cross-appealed the due process denial. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the due process claim and reversed the equal protection ruling, remanding for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether due process requires jury trials for juveniles charged with first degree murder after 1998 Act amendments	Destiny: 1998 reforms made juvenile proceedings sufficiently like adult criminal trials that due process requires jury trials for juveniles facing mandatory incarceration for first degree murder	State: Precedent (McKeiver, Fucini, Jonathon C.B.) holds due process does not require jury trials in juvenile adjudications despite 1998 amendments	Denied — Court held precedent controls: due process does not mandate jury trials for juveniles, including first-degree murder cases under the Act
Whether equal protection requires jury trials for first-time juvenile murder defendants because HJO/VJO juveniles get jury trials	Destiny: First-time murderers are similarly situated to HJO/VJO juveniles because all face mandatory determinate confinement, so denying jury trials is irrational and unequal	State: Classes are not similarly situated—different offenses, histories, statutes, and legislative purposes; rational basis exists for different treatment	Denied — Court held classes are not "in all relevant respects alike"; legislature’s distinctions are rational and constitutional

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (U.S. 1971) (due process does not require jury trials in juvenile adjudications)
In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305 (Ill. 1970) (Illinois precedent rejecting due process-based jury right for juveniles)
In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750 (Ill. 2011) (reaffirmed that 1998 Juvenile Court Act amendments do not create a due process right to jury trials for juveniles)
People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185 (Ill. 2009) (discusses statutory jury rights in certain juvenile proceedings and clarifies statutory grants do not themselves create constitutional due process obligations)
In re M.A., 2015 IL 118049 (Ill. 2015) (explains that "similarly situated" requires classes be alike in all relevant respects and must be assessed in light of statutory purpose)
In re G.O., 304 Ill. App. 3d 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (appellate decision holding first-time murder juveniles similarly situated to HJO/VJO juveniles on sentencing consequences; later vacated on other grounds and not controlling)