People v. Dennisbellairs CA3
C093250A
| Cal. Ct. App. | Mar 30, 2022Background
- Defendant Joshua Dennisbellairs pleaded guilty to violating a domestic relations court order with a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 273.6(d)); factual basis stipulated to the probation report.
- Court granted 36 months' probation; shortly after, defendant tested positive for methamphetamine, admitted ingestion, and probation was reinstated with 90 days in custody for the first violation.
- Defendant later absconded for about a year, was arrested, admitted failing to report, and a supplemental probation report documented numerous prior convictions, multiple probation violations, failure to complete ordered treatment, denial/minimization of culpability, and recommended the upper term (3 years).
- At resentencing the trial court imposed the upper term, citing unsatisfactory performance on probation, absconding, lack of remorse, minimization of responsibility, and exhaustion of probationary options.
- On appeal defendant argued the upper term was an abuse of discretion, the court failed to exercise independent discretion or address aggravating/mitigating factors on the record, the supplemental report contained material errors, and (on rehearing) that SB 567 barred use of probation failure as an aggravating factor.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: SB 567 is retroactive but did not require remand because defendant had stipulated to the probation-related facts used to support the upper term; defendant also forfeited claim about the probation report and failed to show ineffective assistance.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Dennisbellairs’ Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imposition of upper term sentence | Upper term justified by unsatisfactory probation performance, absconding, lack of remorse, prior convictions | Trial court abused discretion; record lacks signed report or on-the-record discussion of aggravating/mitigating factors | Affirmed: one valid aggravating factor (unsatisfactory probation) is sufficient; no abuse of discretion |
| Effect of SB 567 on using probation failure as aggravation | SB 567 is ameliorative and retroactive, but court may consider stipulated or found facts; defendant had stipulated to probation facts | SB 567 prohibits using failure on probation to support an upper term and requires remand | SB 567 applies retroactively but does not require resentencing here because defendant stipulated to facts (probation status) supporting aggravation |
| Reliance on supplemental probation report / material errors | Defendant forfeited challenge by not objecting below | Counsel ineffective for failing to object to alleged material errors in report | Forfeited; counsel’s tactical choices were reasonable—no ineffective assistance shown |
| Use of facts from dismissed counts (Harvey waiver) | Court may consider facts underlying dismissed counts when Harvey waiver given | Probation report improperly relied on dismissed assault/anger issues | Harvey waiver permits consideration; reliance was proper and counsel reasonably declined to press the issue |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825 (2007) (standard of review for selecting lower, middle, or upper term; aggravating factors must justify upper term)
- People v. Osband, 13 Cal.4th 622 (1996) (a single aggravating factor can support imposition of the upper term)
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) (ameliorative statutory changes should be applied retroactively to nonfinal cases)
- People v. Superior Court (Lara), 4 Cal.5th 299 (2018) (retroactivity analysis for ameliorative sentencing changes)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel standard)
- People v. Scott, 9 Cal.4th 331 (1994) (failure to raise sentencing objections in trial court forfeits appellate review)
- People v. Harvey, 25 Cal.3d 754 (1979) (Harvey waiver permits consideration of facts underlying dismissed counts at sentencing)
- People v. Harris, 226 Cal.App.3d 141 (1990) (trial court may consider events occurring after original grant of probation when resentencing upon revocation)
