People v. DeLeon
220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 784
Cal.2017Background
- Allen Dimen DeLeon was arrested Aug. 23, 2013 for alleged parole violations (possessing pornographic material) after being on parole for sex-offense–related convictions.
- Parole agency found probable cause Aug. 26 and filed a petition in superior court Sept. 4; a judicial officer made an ex parte probable-cause finding Sept. 6 and summarily revoked parole; final revocation hearing occurred Oct. 3 (41 days after arrest) and DeLeon was confined 180 days.
- DeLeon moved to dismiss for lack of a Morrissey prerevocation preliminary hearing within 15 days (Pen. Code § 3044); the trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeal held prelim hearings unnecessary post-Realignment.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether Morrissey’s preliminary hearing requirement applies to parole revocations transferred to superior court under the 2011–2012 Realignment Act.
- DeLeon’s custody and parole term ended during appellate proceedings, rendering his appeal technically moot, but the Court exercised discretion to decide the recurring constitutional question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Morrissey’s prerevocation preliminary hearing requirement apply to parole revocations heard in superior court post-Realignment? | State (People) argued Morrissey need not apply as written to judicial proceedings and a timely single hearing may suffice. | DeLeon argued Morrissey requires a prompt preliminary probable-cause hearing even after jurisdiction shifted to superior courts. | Morrissey’s preliminary-hearing requirement applies to revocations under § 1203.2 conducted in superior court. |
| Does voter-enacted § 3044 (Marsy’s Law) require preliminary hearings in superior court revocations? | DeLeon argued § 3044 (adopted by Proposition 9) mandates the 15-day probable-cause hearing apply to superior-court proceedings. | State argued § 3044 was directed to the Board of Parole Hearings (or its administrative successor), not to superior courts, and Realignment did not import § 3044. | § 3044 does not apply to superior-court revocation proceedings; Realignment and later statutes incorporated Morrissey protections, not § 3044’s framework. |
| Is an ex parte judicial probable-cause finding (Gerstein-style) sufficient to satisfy Morrissey’s preliminary hearing due-process requirements? | People/Court of Appeal relied on Gerstein and argued nonadversarial magistrate probable-cause review suffices. | DeLeon argued Morrissey guarantees parolees an opportunity to appear, be heard, present evidence, and cross-examine at the preliminary stage. | Gerstein (Fourth Amendment probable-cause review) is distinct; Morrissey requires a more adversarial, notice-and-opportunity-to-be-heard preliminary proceeding. |
| Is DeLeon’s appeal moot because his custody/parole term ended; and if moot, what relief? | People argued and court agreed the appeal is technically moot because the underlying custody and parole term ended; collateral consequences were too speculative. | DeLeon argued collateral consequences (future sentencing/probation/eligibility) keep the case live. | Appeal is moot under Spencer; the Court nonetheless decided the legal issue and remanded to dismiss the appeal as moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (establishes prerevocation preliminary hearing and final hearing due-process framework)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (applies Morrissey to probation revocations; no relevant distinction between parole and probation for due process)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (Fourth Amendment magistrate probable-cause determinations shortly after arrest are nonadversarial and distinct from Morrissey’s requirements)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (completion of term can moot parole-revocation challenges; speculative collateral consequences insufficient to avoid mootness)
- People v. Vickers, 8 Cal.3d 451 (California case applying Morrissey to probation revocation and requiring preliminary probable-cause determination)
- In re La Croix, 12 Cal.3d 146 (recognizes Morrissey’s preliminary-hearing right for incarcerated California parolees)