People v. DeGreat
2015 COA 101
Colo. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Edward DeGreat was tried for offenses arising from a taxi fare dispute in which he stabbed the driver; he admitted the stabbing but asserted self-defense.
- Jury acquitted DeGreat of attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and theft; convicted him of aggravated robbery, reckless second-degree assault (later reduced), and a crime-of-violence count.
- Trial court instructed the jury that self-defense was an affirmative defense to the murder and first-degree assault charges but refused DeGreat's requested self-defense instruction on aggravated robbery.
- During jury selection the prosecutor used a peremptory strike on Juror M (African-American); defense raised a Batson challenge which the trial court denied based on a demeanor-based, race-neutral explanation.
- At trial the victim testified (without contemporaneous objection) that he was aware DeGreat had been offered a plea bargain; recorded jail phone calls of DeGreat attempting to convince the victim not to testify were admitted after a suppression hearing.
- On appeal DeGreat argued (1) entitlement to a self-defense instruction on aggravated robbery, (2) Batson error, (3) failure to strike plea-bargain testimony, and (4) erroneous admission of recorded jail calls.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether self-defense is an affirmative defense to aggravated robbery where evidence shows a continuous transaction with an asserted defensive assault | Self-defense is inapplicable to aggravated robbery; historical line of authority suggested it cannot justify the taking | DeGreat argued § 18-1-704 permits self-defense as an affirmative defense to general intent crimes like aggravated robbery when evidence supports it | Reversed robbery conviction and remanded: self-defense can be an affirmative defense to aggravated robbery where evidence supports it; refusal to instruct was not harmless |
| Whether prosecutor’s peremptory strike of Juror M violated Batson | Strike was race-neutral: juror’s tone/demeanor and concern about attention span justified the challenge | Strike was pretextual because other jurors expressed similar views on self-defense | Affirmed: trial court did not clearly err in accepting the demeanor-based, race-neutral explanation; no Batson violation shown |
| Whether trial court should have sua sponte struck victim’s testimony that DeGreat was offered a plea bargain | Testimony was prejudicial and should have been removed | No contemporaneous objection; no Colorado authority establishing such testimony is per se inadmissible | Affirmed: no plain error — law not settled to require sua sponte action |
| Whether recording and admission of jailhouse phone calls violated Fourth Amendment or wiretapping statute | Recording was an unlawful search/seizure and violated wiretapping prohibition | Inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in monitored jail calls; statute does not bar recordings of inmate calls | Affirmed: calls admissible; no Fourth Amendment or statutory violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Pickering v. People, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011) (self-defense available to crimes requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness)
- Taylor v. People, 230 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2009) (self-defense instruction appropriate for related general intent offenses intertwined with assault)
- Mullins v. People, 209 P.3d 1147 (Colo. App. 2009) (self-defense as an affirmative defense to certain general intent offenses)
- Beebe v. People, 557 P.2d 840 (Colo. App. 1976) (earlier division opinion holding self-defense not available to aggravated robbery)
- Idrogo v. People, 818 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1991) (any evidence of self-defense requires instruction)
- Garcia v. People, 113 P.3d 775 (Colo. 2005) (improper removal of an affirmative defense from jury consideration is not harmless)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (Batson framework and role of demeanor-based explanations)
- Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (assessment of discriminatory intent and evaluation of juror-strike explanations)
- Mares v. People, 263 P.3d 699 (Colo. App. 2011) (prisoner calls: no reasonable expectation of privacy; admissibility of recorded inmate calls)
- Blehm v. People, 623 P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1980) (recording a phone conversation implicates privacy only when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists)