People v. Davis
2019 IL App (1st) 160408
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2019Background
- Undercover officers investigating Jorge Urbina observed Urbina hand a white package into a silver two‑door Honda occupied by Witherspoon (driver), Jenkins (front passenger), and Parrish Davis (rear seat). Officers followed the Honda and stopped it in a parking area.
- Officers asked occupants about ownership; all denied owning the car. Witherspoon was asked about drugs and (per officers) consented to a search; he later made a nonverbal indication toward the rear of the vehicle.
- Officer Mok began a consented search, found nothing in the front, then pried open a vinyl panel in the rear behind the driver and uncovered a hidden compartment containing a ~989‑gram brick of cocaine, three loaded handguns, ammunition, and a scale.
- Davis moved to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds (stop/search unreasonable; search exceeded consent). The trial court denied suppression, finding a valid Terry stop and either consent or, alternatively, probable cause under the automobile exception.
- Before trial the State moved to admit the guns to prove intent to deliver; the court allowed admission of the recovered guns but limited the State from arguing inferences about intent based on the weapons. The jury convicted Davis of possession with intent to deliver >900g of cocaine.
- Davis received a 25‑year sentence (within the 15–60 year statutory range); he appealed, challenging suppression denial, admission of gun evidence, and sentence length. The court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Davis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Validity/scope of search (suppression) | Stop/search lawful; officer experience + surveillance of Urbina + observed package transfer gave probable cause and/or Witherspoon consented to search rear including hidden compartments | Search exceeded Witherspoon's consent; officer pried interior panels without specific consent and lacked probable cause to search trap compartments | Court: Mok exceeded scope of consent but, by that time, facts (investigation context, observed transfer, vehicle orientation, nod to rear, officer narcotics experience) supplied probable cause; automobile exception justified search — suppression denied |
| 2) Admissibility of gun evidence (other‑crimes) | Guns relevant to prove intent to deliver (one of recognized factors); admission proper and limited | Admission was prejudicial/cumulative and not necessary to prove intent (intent not truly contested) | Court: Other‑crimes evidence admissible to prove intent even if defendant did not expressly contest intent; guns relevant and admitted with limited detail; no abuse of discretion |
| 3) Sentence excessive / remand for reasons stated | N/A (State urged sentence above minimum given quantity and weapons) | 25 years is excessive given nonviolent offense, lack of prior record, mental health/substance issues; judge failed to adequately state reasons | Court: Sentence (25 yrs) within statutory range and not an abuse of discretion; judge considered PSI and factors and provided adequate explanation — affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (stop/search standard for investigative stops)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (scope of consent search judged by objective reasonableness)
- California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (automobile exception to warrant requirement)
- People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36 (other‑crimes evidence admissible to prove intent/motive)
- People v. Holliday, 318 Ill. App. 3d 106 (consent search scope cannot be stretched to highly intrusive searches without specificity)
- People v. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d 18 (factors relevant to intent to deliver include possession of weapons)
- People v. Knight, 309 Ill. App. 3d 224 (discussion on limits of other‑crimes evidence when intent not contested)
- People v. Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d 146 (objective test for scope of consent searches)
- People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397 (consideration of offense seriousness in sentencing)