2018 COA 113
Colo. Ct. App.2018Background
- In 1986, 17‑year‑old Eric Davis participated with Thomas McGrath in a robbery in which the victim was shot and killed; Davis was convicted of first‑degree murder (after deliberation) and related offenses.
- Davis was sentenced, as required by statute then in effect, to life with possibility of parole after 40 years (LWPP‑40) for murder and a consecutive 8 years and 1 day for aggravated robbery.
- Davis filed postconviction Crim. P. 35(c) motions (one in 2003, another in 2013) raising (inter alia) suppression of statements, invalid waiver of his right to testify, and Eighth Amendment challenges to his sentence.
- The trial court denied suppression (Denver detectives’ statements admitted after Davis had earlier invoked counsel in Miami) as voluntary reinitiation; postconviction court rejected the claims and denied relief after an evidentiary hearing on the waiver issue.
- The court of appeals reviewed de novo and affirmed: suppression error (if any) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given duplicative Miami statements and overwhelming other evidence; the Curtis advisement satisfied the right‑to‑testify waiver standards; and Davis’s Eighth Amendment challenges to LWPP‑40 (and the consecutive term) failed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Davis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Suppression of Denver statements | Statements admissible because Davis voluntarily reinitiated after invoking counsel in Miami; any error harmless because Miami statements remained admissible and evidence of guilt was overwhelming | Denver interrogation violated Edwards because Davis had earlier requested counsel, so Denver statements should be suppressed | Affirmed: even if admission erred, error harmless beyond reasonable doubt (duplication and strong independent evidence) |
| 2. Waiver of right to testify | Curtis advisement was given on the record and no evidence showed the waiver was involuntary; trial counsel’s testimony supported that Davis could have testified | Trial court never obtained an explicit on‑the‑record waiver; Davis would have testified but was prevented | Affirmed: Curtis advisement was adequate; Davis failed to present specific evidence at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing to overcome presumption of valid waiver |
| 3. Consecutive LWPP‑40 + 8‑yr sentence: de facto LWOP | Aggregate term‑of‑years is not the functional equivalent of LWOP; courts have discretion to impose consecutive terms | Combined mandatory minimums (40 + 8+ yrs) create a de facto LWOP and violate Eighth Amendment under Graham/Miller | Affirmed: Lucero forecloses treating aggregate term‑of‑years as LWOP; consecutive sentencing was within trial court’s discretion and not an Eighth Amendment violation |
| 4. LWPP‑40 (pre‑1991 scheme) and Colorado parole process | LWPP‑40 is constitutional for juveniles (Tate); Colorado parole statutes and rules permit consideration of youth and rehabilitation, providing a meaningful opportunity for release | Pre‑1991 statute failed to differentiate juveniles from adults (no required youth‑specific consideration); Colorado parole procedures do not guarantee a meaningful, realistic opportunity for release | Affirmed: Tate and Colorado precedent support LWPP‑40’s constitutionality; Davis showed no evidence the parole board would not consider youth, so parole provides meaningful opportunity per Graham/Miller |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes cannot receive LWOP; must have a meaningful opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory LWOP for juveniles; sentencing must consider youth and attendant characteristics)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced substantive rule and applies retroactively)
- People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959 (Colo. 2015) (Colorado Supreme Court held LWPP‑40 constitutional for juveniles and set LWPP‑40 as appropriate remedy for certain juvenile LWOP sentences)
- Lucero v. People, 394 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2017) (aggregate term‑of‑years sentences are not subject to Graham/Miller as LWOP equivalents)
- People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984) (trial court must give five‑part advisement regarding defendant’s right to testify)
- People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1999) (procedure for raising right‑to‑testify claims in postconviction proceedings)