People v. Davis
2017 COA 40
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In early 2013 law enforcement wiretapped Leonel Gonzalez‑Gonzalez and recorded calls between him and Kelly Gene Davis; arrests followed and Davis was charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and habitual criminal allegations.
- Prosecution presented testimony from accomplices (Deziree Fisher and Terry Lawrence) and a detective who described recorded calls and surveillance showing Davis meeting a co‑conspirator to obtain drugs.
- The charged conspiracy covered acts from February 21 to April 8, 2013, in one county and involved repeated drug-supply arrangements with Gonzalez‑Gonzalez.
- At trial the jury convicted Davis of conspiracy; the court found habitual criminal status and sentenced him to 48 years.
- On appeal Davis argued the prosecution should have been required to elect a particular overt act (or the court to give a special unanimity instruction), should have been given a limiting instruction about accomplice pleas/plea hopes, and that the court improperly found prior convictions rather than a jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecution had to elect a particular overt act or court give special unanimity instruction for conspiracy count | People: single conspiracy charged; no election or special unanimity instruction required | Davis: jury must unanimously agree on a specific overt act in furtherance of conspiracy | Held: single conspiracy here — jury must unanimously find an overt act was committed but need not agree on which specific overt act; no election or special unanimity instruction required |
| Whether trial court erred by not sua sponte giving a limiting instruction about accomplice guilty plea/hope for plea | People: testimony about accomplices’ pleas/plea motivations was admissible and defense chose strategy; no statutory duty to give limiting instruction sua sponte | Davis: jury may improperly consider accomplice plea statements as substantive evidence of his guilt | Held: No plain error; defense did not request instruction and court had no duty to give one sua sponte; testimony was relevant and defense exploited it |
| Whether judge (not jury) could find prior convictions for aggravated habitual sentence | People: prior‑conviction exception permits judge to find prior convictions for sentencing enhancement | Davis: Apprendi/Blakely developments undermining prior‑conviction exception mean only a jury should find facts increasing penalty | Held: Under existing Supreme Court and Colorado precedent, prior convictions are Blakely‑exempt; judge’s findings did not violate right to jury trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (single agreement constituting one conspiracy)
- Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (unanimity required as to guilt, not alternative means)
- Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (indictment need not specify which overt act among several)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by jury, except prior convictions)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (applies Apprendi rule to sentencing)
- People v. Taggart, 621 P.2d 1375 (unanimity pertains to ultimate guilt, not alternative means)