People v. Davis
200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642
Cal. Ct. App.2016Background
- In April 2014 Leon Davis pleaded no contest to felony simple possession (Health & Safety Code §11377(a)) and the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on five years' probation.
- In November 2014 voters adopted Proposition 47, which reclassified certain drug/property felonies as misdemeanors and enacted Penal Code §1170.18 to permit resentencing for persons “currently serving a sentence” or who “have completed his or her sentence.”
- §1170.18(b) requires a petition for recall of sentence and allows resentencing unless the court finds an unreasonable risk to public safety; §1170.18(k) preserves a felony firearms prohibition after recall.
- Davis argued he was not "currently serving a sentence" because he was on probation (imposition of sentence suspended) and therefore he should receive an unconditional retroactive reduction under In re Estrada rather than the §1170.18 petition process (which carries the firearms ban).
- The trial court required Davis to file a §1170.18 petition (he did so under protest), recalled his sentence, reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor, and later revoked and then restored probation after a violation hearing.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding probationers are "currently serving a sentence" under §1170.18 and Estrada does not override the express petition scheme of Proposition 47.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a person on probation is “currently serving a sentence” under Penal Code §1170.18(a) | §1170.18 covers persons subject to judicially imposed sanctions, including probation; electorate intended inclusive remedy | Probation suspends imposition of sentence, so probationers are not "serving a sentence" and should get automatic retroactive relief under Estrada | Probationers are "currently serving a sentence" for §1170.18 purposes; petition procedure applies |
| Whether Estrada requires an unconditional retroactive reduction (avoiding §1170.18 conditions like firearm ban) | N/A (respondent argued §1170.18 governs) | Estrada's presumption of retroactivity entitles defendant to mitigation without §1170.18 conditions | Estrada is inapplicable because Proposition 47/§1170.18 expresses the electorate's intent for the precise retroactive remedy |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (Cal. 1965) (presumption that statute reducing punishment applies retroactively absent contrary intent)
- People v. Lynall, 233 Cal.App.4th 1102 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (describing Proposition 47 enactment/effective date)
- People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal.App.4th 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (Proposition 36 petition scheme is functional equivalent of saving clause; petition is sole remedy)
- People v. Brown, 54 Cal.4th 314 (Cal. 2012) (legislative intent controls retroactivity; Penal Code §3 presumption against retroactivity)
- People v. Nasalga, 12 Cal.4th 784 (Cal. 1996) (Estrada confined to its specific context; express saving clause defeats Estrada)
- People v. Howard, 16 Cal.4th 1081 (Cal. 1997) (probation order treated as final judgment for limited appeal purposes)