People v. Dalton
2017 IL App (3d) 150213
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Dalton was charged in Dec 2003 with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (based on acts July 16, 2001 and Nov 7, 2001). He was held in custody.
- More than 120 days later (May 17, 2004) the State filed an amended information adding counts III–V (different acts) and count VI (criminal sexual assault based on the same July 16, 2001 act alleged in count I, with a cohabitation allegation and a higher felony class).
- At final pretrial the defense expressly agreed to keep the trial date and stated there would be no speedy-trial issue; trial proceeded and jury convicted Dalton on counts III–V and VI; count I/II were not decided by the jury.
- Dalton pursued postconviction relief asserting, among other claims, that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a speedy-trial claim challenging the late-filed count VI; the trial court denied relief, concluding count VI was merely an "upgrade."
- Dalton also filed a pro se petition treated as a 2-1401 petition; the trial court allowed filing but sua sponte dismissed it before the State’s 30-day response period expired.
- The appellate court reversed: it held the late filing of count VI violated the 120-day speedy-trial statute, appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising it, and the 2-1401 petition was prematurely dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether filing count VI more than 120 days after the original charges violated the speedy-trial statute | Count VI was an "upgrade" of count I (same act/date/witnesses) and thus did not trigger mandatory-joinder/speedy-trial protections | Count VI was a distinct offense (different elements and greater class) based on the same physical act, so it had to be filed within 120 days | Held: Speedy-trial right violated as to count VI; it was not merely an upgrade and required filing within 120 days |
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the speedy-trial violation on appeal | No explicit defense; State argued waiver/forfeiture and treated count VI as proper | Appellate counsel’s omission was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial because a timely motion would have required dismissal of count VI | Held: Appellate counsel ineffective; Dalton made a substantial showing and is entitled to relief on that claim |
| Whether Dalton waived the issue by earlier counsel or appellate process | State argued waiver/forfeiture based on prior proceedings and counsel statements at pretrial | Dalton argued claim preserved via postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (waiver doctrine inapplicable when appellate counsel was incompetent) | Held: Waiver doctrine does not bar the postconviction ineffective-assistance claim; relief available under Flores principle |
| Whether the trial court properly sua sponte dismissed Dalton’s pro se 2-1401 petition before the State’s 30-day response period | State contended presence/acknowledgment in court waived the 30-day answer period | Dalton argued the court lacked authority to dismiss before the response period elapsed | Held: Dismissal was premature; court erred by dismissing before the 30-day period expired and absent an express waiver or responsive pleading |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191 (2003) (mandatory joinder and 120-day speedy-trial rule apply to offenses based on the same act)
- People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54 (2010) (statutory amendments allowed certain recharacterizations without triggering joinder/speedy-trial issues under specific circumstances)
- People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286 (2006) (remedy for speedy-trial violation is dismissal of the charge)
- People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264 (1992) (postconviction review can reach claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that otherwise would be waived)
- People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318 (2009) (procedural rules for section 2-1401: responding party has 30 days to answer; court cannot sua sponte dismiss before that period unless pleading deficient)
- People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (2007) (failure to answer a 2-1401 petition in 30 days admits well-pleaded facts and makes petition ripe)
- People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261 (2002) (third-stage postconviction review standards)
- People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65 (2002) (de novo review applies to pure questions of law at third stage)
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (procedural standard for appointed counsel seeking to withdraw when appeal lacks merit)