People v. Dalton, 79 N.E.3d 883

Background

Dalton was charged Dec. 30, 2003 with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (counts I & II) based on alleged acts in 2001; he was held in custody.
More than 120 days later (May 17, 2004) the State filed an amended information adding counts III–VI; count VI charged criminal sexual assault based on the same act alleged in count I but as a greater offense and with a cohabitation allegation.
At a final pretrial conference defense counsel expressly agreed to keep the scheduled trial date and stated there would be “no speedy trial issue.” No speedy-trial motion was made at trial or in posttrial motions.
A jury convicted Dalton on counts III–VI; he was sentenced to consecutive terms. Direct appeal was dismissed after appellate counsel filed an Anders brief raising no speedy-trial claim.
Dalton filed a postconviction petition alleging appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the speedy-trial violation as to count VI; the trial court found the claim warranted a third-stage hearing but later denied relief, and separately sua sponte dismissed a pro se pleading the court treated as a 2-1401 petition.
The appellate court reversed: it held the late filing of count VI (same act as count I) violated the 120-day speedy-trial statute; appellate counsel’s failure to raise that issue was ineffective assistance; and the trial court prematurely dismissed the section 2-1401 petition before the State’s 30-day response period expired.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether filing count VI more than 120 days after initial charges violated the speedy-trial statute	The late charge did not violate speedy-trial because count VI was an "upgrade" and count I gave adequate notice	Count VI was a separate offense based on the same act and had different elements (cohabitation and greater felony class); must have been filed within 120 days	The late filing of count VI violated the 120-day speedy-trial statute because it charged a distinct offense based on the same act
Whether appellate counsel’s failure to raise the speedy-trial issue on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance	No prejudice; issues on appeal lacked merit	Failure to raise clear statutory violation was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial	Appellate counsel was objectively deficient and prejudice resulted; postconviction relief required as to count VI
Whether waiver or forfeiture bars Dalton’s postconviction ineffective-assistance claim	State argued procedural default/waiver	Dalton argued claim arises from appellate counsel’s incompetence and was not previously available	Waiver doctrine did not bar the postconviction ineffective-assistance claim
Whether the trial court properly sua sponte dismissed Dalton’s pro se section 2-1401 petition before the State’s 30-day response period expired	State contended in-court presence of ASA waived the 30-day period	Dalton argued dismissal was premature because the State had 30 days to answer	Dismissal was premature; court erred in dismissing before the 30-day response period expired

Key Cases Cited

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (standards for counsel seeking to withdraw on appeal)
People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191 (2003) (120-day speedy-trial period covers offenses that must be mandatorily joined because they arise from the same act)
People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54 (2010) (statutory amendment context where replacement charge did not implicate mandatory joinder)
People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264 (1992) (postconviction claims alleging appellate counsel incompetence are not waived)
People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318 (2009) (section 2-1401 notice and 30-day response rule; court cannot sua sponte dismiss before response period expires)
People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (2007) (failure to answer a 2-1401 petition within 30 days admits well-pleaded facts and ripens petition)
People v. Stanley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 307 (1994) (failure to raise speedy-trial violation can constitute deficient appellate performance)