People v. d'Estree
2024 COA 106
Colo. Ct. App.2024Background
- On Oct. 15, 2019 a homicide occurred; police later arrested Alec d’Estree and seized his iPhone.
- Police obtained a first warrant (Nov. 20, 2019) that was overbroad (no subject/time limits); the phone was password‑protected and initial extraction failed.
- The phone was sent to the U.S. Secret Service, which ran Cellebrite brute‑force software and (after months) provided a PIN; police used that PIN to extract data in Feb. 2020.
- The district court later suppressed the data from the first extraction as obtained under an invalid, general warrant.
- Prosecutors sought and obtained a second, date‑limited warrant (Oct. 11, 2021) that expressly authorized obtaining passwords or using brute‑force tools; rather than rely on a new prolonged brute‑force effort, investigators used the PIN code obtained during the first (suppressed) search to unlock and extract phone data for trial.
- The extracted phone images, texts, and internet history were admitted at trial and used to convict d’Estree; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the second‑warrant evidence was tainted by the illegally obtained PIN and that obtaining a PIN by brute force is a Fourth Amendment search requiring warrant authorization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the second warrant met the independent‑source doctrine | People: second affidavit was independent (limited dates, added cellphone capability detail) and court could properly rely on it | d’Estree: second warrant relied on knowledge of data discovered in first unlawful extraction (e.g., existence of searches), so it was not independent | Court: second warrant, on its face, met independent‑source criteria, but independence was defeated because police used PIN obtained in the illegal first search when executing the second warrant |
| Whether obtaining a phone PIN by brute‑force (or using brute‑force results) is a Fourth Amendment search | People: brute force is a means of executing a warrant (analogous to manner of entry) and not a separate search when authorized by warrant | d’Estree: forcing a device (and accessing its passcode) intrudes on privacy and is a search requiring its own constitutional authorization | Court: discovering a PIN by brute force (or otherwise obtaining a PIN without consent) is a Fourth Amendment search; passwords/PINs carry protected privacy interests and warrant authorization is required |
| Whether use of the PIN discovered during the first, suppressed search taints the second warrant (fruit of the poisonous tree) | People: even if the PIN was found earlier, the second warrant authorized brute force and would have lawfully produced access; independent‑source/inevitable discovery doctrines apply | d’Estree: use of the PIN (illegally obtained) to expedite the second extraction rendered the second execution dependent on the first illegality and thus inadmissible | Court: police used illegally obtained information (the PIN) to execute the second warrant, putting government in a better position than without the illegal search; evidence must be excluded |
| Whether the inevitable‑discovery exception saves the evidence | People: PIN would inevitably have been discovered by lawful brute force authorized by second warrant (finite combinations) | d’Estree: discovery was the product of an illegal shortcut; inevitability requires lawful means already underway and not abandoned for a tainted shortcut | Court: inevitable‑discovery does not apply—lawful brute‑force means authorized by the second warrant was abandoned in favor of the illegally obtained PIN, and lawful means were not shown to have been in progress at the time of the illegality; exception fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (cell phones hold vast private data; warrant generally required to search phone)
- Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (inevitable‑discovery rationale balancing exclusionary rule deterrence and truth‑seeking)
- Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (independent‑source doctrine; government should not be put in worse position than without misconduct)
- Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (evidence obtained by forbidden means cannot be used at all)
- Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (warrants need not specify precise manner of execution; execution still subject to Fourth Amendment review)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (reasonable expectation of privacy test defining a Fourth Amendment search)
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (meaning of seizure and interference with possessory interests)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional errors)
- United States v. Booker, 561 F. Supp. 3d 924 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (compelled or government‑facilitated forced disclosure of passcodes raises Fourth Amendment concerns)