People v. Custer
155 N.E.3d 374
Ill.2020Background
- Custer pleaded guilty in a 2010 drug case and later received the maximum six-year sentence at sentencing; he subsequently pleaded guilty to separate offenses and received consecutive terms.
- In May 2014 Custer filed a pro se postconviction petition claiming his trial counsel, Hendricks, was ineffective for failing to appeal or move to withdraw the guilty plea.
- At second stage, appointed postconviction counsel Snyder filed a supplemental petition with affidavits (including Custer’s) alleging counsel failed to appeal as requested; the trial court advanced the petition to an evidentiary (third-stage) hearing.
- At the evidentiary hearing Hendricks denied Custer’s allegations; the trial court found Hendricks credible, rejected Custer’s testimony, and denied the postconviction petition.
- Custer then filed a pro se motion to reconsider, claiming postconviction counsel Snyder unreasonably refused to call a corroborating witness (Colvin); the appellate court ordered a remand for a “Krankel-like” inquiry into the pro se claim.
- The State sought Supreme Court review; this appeal asks whether Krankel procedures (preliminary inquiry and possible appointment of new counsel) should be extended to claims of unreasonable assistance by postconviction counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Custer) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness: Has Custer already received the requested Krankel relief? | The remand hearing was cursory and did not functionally satisfy a Krankel inquiry. | The appellate remand and hearing mooted the issue because Custer received the requested relief. | Not moot: the hearing was inadequate to satisfy Krankel’s objectives. |
| Should Krankel procedures be extended to pro se claims of unreasonable assistance by postconviction counsel? | A Krankel-like inquiry is needed to ensure meaningful review of postconviction counsel performance and to effectuate the Act. | Krankel should not be extended: postconviction counsel serve by legislative grace, Rule 651 limits duties, extension would burden courts without offsetting benefits. | Declined to extend Krankel to postconviction counsel claims; Krankel remains limited to posttrial (trial-counsel) claims. |
| Remedy/remand: What happens next procedurally? | Sought appointment of new (conflict-free) counsel or a proper Krankel inquiry for the motion to reconsider. | Opposed appointment and broader Krankel expansion. | Appellate court judgment reversed; cause remanded so appellate court can address other issues Custer raised (no automatic Krankel relief). |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (Ill. 1984) (established procedure requiring trial-court inquiry into pro se claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel)
- People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071 (Ill. 2017) (clarified that a preliminary inquiry is required but appointment of new counsel is not automatic)
- People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227 (Ill. 2018) (recognized need for some means to review postconviction counsel performance)
- People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68 (Ill. 2003) (discussed standards for appointing new counsel after inquiry)
- People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (Ill. 2007) (held that a Rule 651 certificate creates a rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance)
- People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (Ill. 2006) (explained that postconviction proceedings require a lower "reasonable assistance" standard)