People v. Cunningham
61 Cal. 4th 609
| Cal. | 2015Background
- Defendant John Lee Cunningham robbed, bound, shot to death three employees at Surplus Office Sales (SOS) in Ontario (June 27, 1992), set the building on fire, fled the state, and was arrested in South Dakota. He confessed in multiple recorded interviews and participated in a videotaped reenactment.
- Cunningham waived a jury for the guilt phase (bench trial) and was convicted of three first-degree murders with special‑circumstance findings; a jury later returned a death verdict at penalty phase. Trial court imposed death and additional determinate terms; this appeal is automatic.
- Defense mitigation at penalty focused on childhood abuse, traumatic Vietnam service, and expert testimony diagnosing PTSD and dissociation; prosecution presented aggravation evidence including prior sexual and robbery convictions and victim impact testimony.
- Pretrial and some proceedings involved in‑transit shackling (transport through courthouse halls); defendant waived presence at many pretrial/guilt‑phase hearings and waived a guilt‑phase jury.
- Several evidentiary and procedural claims were litigated below: alleged Miranda violations and voluntariness of statements and reenactment, statutory/presence waiver errors, claims of systematic exclusion of Hispanics from venires, Batson/Wheeler challenges to excusal of African‑American jurors, and proportionality/constitutional challenges to California’s death penalty scheme.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Cunningham’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pretrial/in‑transit shackling | Shackling during transfer was a reasonable security precaution and did not affect trial fairness | Shackling was unnecessary, painful, coerced waivers of presence and jury; required manifest necessity | Court: In‑transit shackling lawful without particularized showing; no abuse of discretion and did not coerce waivers (harmless statutory error if any) |
| Waiver of right to be personally present / jury at guilt phase | Waivers were knowing, voluntary, made with court advisements and counsel’s concurrence | Waivers coerced by shackling and thus invalid under state statutes (§§ 977,1043) and constitution | Court: Waivers were constitutionally valid; statutory violation (if not forfeited) harmless — no prejudice shown |
| Bench trial / alleged “slow plea” / counsel strategy | Submission to bench trial was not tantamount to guilty plea; defendant still confronted witnesses; counsel contested prosecution | Failure to present affirmative defense or witnesses equated to a de facto guilty plea without Boykin‑Tahl advisals | Court: No slow‑plea; defendant did not surrender confrontation or silence rights; no Boykin‑Tahl requirement here |
| Admissibility of custodial statements and reenactment (Miranda, voluntariness, invocation) | Statements and reenactment followed Miranda or were otherwise admissible; no Edwards/Davis invocation; any early ‘‘softening’’ was cured by later warnings | Police omitted express waiver, used inducements (softening about girlfriend), and ignored ambiguous request for counsel; statements involuntary | Court: No deliberate Miranda violation requiring suppression; implied waiver valid; question "Should I have somebody here..." was ambiguous, not an invocation; reenactment admissible |
| Jury‑selection (systematic exclusion of Hispanics) | Master list and juror procedures were race‑neutral; disparities not constitutionally significant nor shown to be caused by systematic exclusion | Statistical underrepresentation demonstrated by expert (absolute and relative disparities) and process defects (summons follow‑up, excusals) | Court: Defense failed Duren prima facie showing — disparities not shown constitutionally significant and no proof of systematic state action |
| Batson/Wheeler challenges to prosecution peremptory strikes | Prosecution’s strikes had race‑neutral reasons (juror attitudes, receptivity to mental‑health testimony, body language) | Prosecutor used disproportionate peremptories against African‑Americans; trial court failed to find prima facie case | Court: Most objections forfeited; for timely objection (D.W.) independent review found no prima facie inference of racial discrimination; reasons race‑neutral |
| Penalty‑phase evidentiary, proportionality, and statutory challenges | Photographs, video, and aggravation evidence probative at penalty; court properly reweighed mitigation; CA death scheme constitutional | Photographs prejudicial; mitigation (PTSD, abuse) underweighted; death is disproportionate; various scheme defects | Court: Admission proper under §352 at penalty; trial court performed independent §190.4(e) reweighing; death sentence not disproportionate; CA death scheme challenges rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court) (Miranda warnings and custodial interrogation)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court) (requirement to cease interrogation after invocation of counsel)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (Supreme Court) (ambiguity requirement for invocation of right to counsel)
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (Supreme Court) (constitutionality of visible shackling before jury)
- Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (Supreme Court) (fair cross‑section jury standard)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (Supreme Court) (prohibition on race‑based peremptory challenges)
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (Supreme Court) (exclusion for death‑penalty opposition)
- People v. Wallace, 44 Cal.4th 1032 (Cal. 2008) (shackling review standard)
- People v. Rundle, 43 Cal.4th 76 (Cal. 2008) (limits on waiving presence in capital cases)
- People v. Bonilla, 41 Cal.4th 313 (Cal. 2007) (Batson/Wheeler practice and recordmaking)