People v. Cross, 2022 IL 127907

Defendant Latron Cross was arrested July 9, 2017, remained in custody, and faced a 120‑day speedy‑trial clock.
Over the next year Cross moved for continuances several times (delays attributed to him); on July 16, 2018 he answered ready and the court set trial for Sept 24, 2018 (70 days attributed to the State at that time).
On August 21, 2018 (one month before trial), Cross for the first time disclosed an alibi witness (his grandmother) and attached an investigator’s report.
The State asked the court to attribute the period from Aug 21 to Sept 24 to Cross; after a hearing the court attributed 34 days (Aug 21–Sept 24) to Cross even though the Sept 24 trial date remained on the calendar.
The case was continued to Nov 6, 2018 (attributed to the State); Cross was tried Nov 6, convicted of first‑degree murder, and sentenced to 59 years; appellate court affirmed.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding a defendant‑caused delay need not postpone a scheduled trial date to toll the 120‑day statutory period; therefore no speedy‑trial violation and no ineffective‑assistance or plain‑error relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Cross)	Held
Whether a delay "occasioned by the defendant" under 725 ILCS 5/103‑5(a) must postpone a set trial date to be attributed to the defendant	A defendant’s act (late alibi disclosure) that changes the case posture and forces the State to investigate can be delay attributable to defendant even if the court does not move the trial date	Delay can be attributed to defendant only if the defendant’s action actually postpones a scheduled trial date	The Court held the statute does not require postponement of a set trial date; any defendant‑occasioned delay may toll the 120‑day period; trial court did not abuse discretion in attributing 34 days to Cross
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss on speedy‑trial grounds	No prejudice because there was no speedy‑trial violation once the court properly attributed the 34 days to Cross	Counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal when the court changed its attribution from the State to Cross	Because there was no statutory speedy‑trial violation, counsel’s failure to move to dismiss was not prejudicial; ineffective‑assistance claim fails

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380 (2006) (section 103‑5(a) does not require delay to be of a set trial date to toll the speedy‑trial period)
People v. Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d 602 (1999) (trial court’s attribution of delay reviewed for abuse of discretion; unique facts can make attributing delay to defendant improper)
People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540 (1989) (criterion is whether defendant’s acts in fact caused or contributed to the delay)
People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268 (1984) (delays caused by defendant motions and related processing time may toll the speedy‑trial clock)
People v. Boyd, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (2006) (appellate decision stating delay must postpone trial date—overruled by this Court as overbroad)
United States v. Ford, 683 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining importance of advance notice of alibi so prosecution can investigate)