People v. Croft
2018 IL App (1st) 150043
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- At 17, Curtis Croft participated in the gang rape, kidnapping, and murder of 16-year-old Kim Boyd; the victim suffered extensive stab wounds and other severe injuries.
- Croft was convicted (bench trial) of murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal sexual assault; originally sentenced to natural life plus concurrent terms; remanded and resentenced to the same punishments by a different judge in 1992.
- At resentencing, Croft presented mitigation (family testimony, minister, PSI, allocution) and the judge reiterated a discretionary natural-life sentence, finding the crime exceptionally brutal and Croft essentially incorrigible.
- Croft previously litigated postconviction claims, including an earlier Miller challenge that this court rejected in 2013 on the ground Miller did not apply to discretionary life sentences and because the sentencing court had considered his youth.
- Croft filed a successive postconviction petition arguing Miller error; the circuit court dismissed it as barred by res judicata based on the 2013 Croft decision.
- On appeal, the State conceded res judicata no longer bars the claim in light of intervening law; the appellate court considered whether the resentencing complied with Miller/Holman and affirmed dismissal on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Croft) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether res judicata bars Croft’s successive Miller claim | Res judicata applied under this court’s prior Croft decision | Miller and later Illinois precedent changed the law; res judicata should not bar the claim | Res judicata does not bar the claim due to intervening changes in law (Holman, Reyes, Davis, Montgomery) |
| Whether Miller applies to discretionary life-without-parole sentences | Miller applies to juvenile life-equivalent sentences; court agreed it now controls | Previously argued Miller did not apply to discretionary life; now argues Miller entitles him to resentencing | Miller applies to discretionary juvenile life terms; Croft may raise the claim (Holman) |
| Whether the resentencing hearing satisfied Miller/Holman requirements | Sentencing court considered youth and attendant characteristics as reflected in PSI, witnesses, and allocution | Sentencing court failed to meaningfully consider youth, immaturity, role in offense, competence, or make findings on incorrigibility | Held that the cold record shows the court considered the Holman factors and Croft had opportunity to present mitigation; sentencing complied with Miller/Holman |
| Whether Croft is entitled to a new sentencing hearing | N/A (People defended the sentence) | Requests a new hearing to allow consideration of "hallmark features" of youth and to rebut incorrigibility finding | Denied: appellate court will not substitute its judgment; record shows adequate consideration of youth and attendant characteristics; sentence upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory juvenile life without parole requires consideration of youth)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. _ (Miller announces a substantive rule that applies retroactively)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (juveniles cannot be executed)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offense unconstitutional)
- People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 (Illinois: Miller is retroactive on collateral review)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (term-of-years that is de facto life triggers Miller)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Miller applies to discretionary juvenile life without parole and provides Holman factors for review)
- People v. Croft, 2013 IL App (1st) 121473 (prior appellate ruling rejecting Miller for discretionary life; superseded by Holman)