People v. Croft
2013 IL App (1st) 121473
Ill. App. Ct.2014Background
- At 17, Curtis Croft participated in the gang rape and murder of a 16-year-old; convicted in 1987 of murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal sexual assault.
- After direct appeal and a resentencing (new judge), Croft was again sentenced to natural life without parole for murder; court described the murder as extremely brutal and heinous and stated it considered the presentence report and "the crime and the criminal."
- Croft filed multiple postconviction petitions over the years; an initial pro se petition was dismissed as untimely but remanded after supervisory review; later petitions alleged his life sentence was unconstitutional under developments in juvenile sentencing law.
- Croft’s later postconviction petition (raising Miller-type claims) was dismissed at the second stage as untimely and for failing to show the delay was not due to culpable negligence.
- On appeal, Croft argued Miller v. Alabama required reconsideration because his murder occurred when he was under 18 and his sentence did not adequately account for youth-related mitigating factors.
- The appellate court affirmed: Croft’s petition remained untimely (for reasons the court found not excusing delay), and on the merits Miller did not invalidate his discretionary life sentence because the trial court had considered mitigating youth evidence and the sentence was discretionary, not mandatory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / culpable negligence of postconviction petition | State: petition untimely; Croft failed to show lack of culpable negligence | Croft: delay excused because he pursued federal relief, prison confiscated his materials, and he believed constitutional claim tolled time limits | Court: Croft failed to show lack of culpable negligence; explanations insufficient (but State forfeited raising timeliness on appeal) |
| Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama | State: Miller is a new rule and not retroactive on collateral review | Croft: Miller should apply to his case because the murder occurred when he was a juvenile | Court: Miller is a new rule but this case didn’t require retroactive application because Miller prohibits mandatory life-without-parole, not discretionary sentences |
| Applicability of Miller to Croft’s sentence | State: Croft received a discretionary life term after the court considered factors, including age | Croft: his sentence was imposed without proper consideration of youth’s hallmark features per Miller | Court: sentencing court considered presentence report (including age) and "the crime and the criminal"; sentence was discretionary and imposed because the murder was exceptionally brutal and heinous, so Miller does not require relief |
| Merits: Eighth Amendment challenge to juvenile life sentence | State: no Eighth Amendment violation where sentencing was discretionary and considered youth | Croft: mandatory-like effect of life without parole for juvenile is unconstitutional under Miller | Court: No Eighth Amendment violation shown; discretionary sentence properly applied after consideration of mitigating youth factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; sentencer must consider youth and attendant characteristics)
- People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002) (culpable negligence standard for untimely postconviction petitions)
- People v. Lander, 215 Ill. 2d 577 (2005) (ignorance of law does not excuse untimely filing)
- People v. Sanders, 238 Ill. 2d 391 (2010) (discussion of retroactivity and procedural rules for collateral relief)
- People v. Partin, 156 Ill. App. 3d 365 (1987) (trial court presumed to have considered evidence of mitigation)
- People v. Wallace, 406 Ill. App. 3d 172 (2010) (applicable time limits are those in effect when postconviction petition was filed)