2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 409
Cal. Ct. App. 2nd2016Background
- Defendant Ronald J. Cowan was convicted by a jury of multiple sexual offenses against a child under ten, including sodomy, oral copulation, and lewd acts; sentence 65 years to life.
- At closing, the prosecutor told jurors the presumption of innocence "is in place only when the charges are read" and therefore was "gone" after evidence was presented. Defense counsel objected; trial court admonished that attorney argument must conform to the court's instructions.
- Prosecutor also urged jurors to use everyday decisionmaking and reason to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and argued the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence was guilt. Defense raised misconduct claims on appeal.
- Trial court had given proper reasonable-doubt instructions and told jurors to follow the court's instructions over counsel's remarks. The jury returned guilty verdicts.
- The appellate court found the specific statement that the presumption ends when charges are read was grossly wrong and constituted prosecutorial misconduct, but concluded errors were harmless due to proper instructions, admonition, and overwhelming evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor misstated law by saying presumption of innocence applies only when charges are read | People: Comment was argument that evidence overcame presumption; not misconduct (distinguishing Booker) | Cowan: Statement was legally incorrect, misstated presumption, lightened prosecution's burden | Misconduct: statement was plainly wrong and egregious, but harmless given instructions and strong evidence |
| Whether prosecutor's analogy to everyday decisionmaking misstated reasonable-doubt standard | People: Argument framed use of reason and common sense; analogous to permissible argument | Cowan: Such comparisons improperly lower standard to ordinary decisions | Waived at trial (no timely objection); admonition could have cured harm, so waived on appeal |
| Whether arguing "reasonable interpretation" standard improperly lowered burden | People: Argued aggregate evidence yields only reasonable interpretation of guilt | Cowan: Argued this invites conviction on mere reasonable belief, not beyond reasonable doubt | Court: Proper argument when asserting only reasonable interpretation is guilt; not misconduct |
| Whether cumulative misconduct required reversal despite harmless-error doctrine | Cowan: Multiple improper remarks infected fairness requiring reversal | People: Trial instructions and admonition cure errors; evidence overwhelming | Court: Errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (presumption of innocence is fundamental to fair trial)
- People v. Marshall, 13 Cal.4th 799 (1996) (prosecutor may not misstate law to reduce burden of proof)
- People v. Hill, 17 Cal.4th 800 (1998) (prosecutorial misconduct denies due process if it renders trial fundamentally unfair)
- People v. Cole, 33 Cal.4th 1158 (2004) (review asks whether reasonable likelihood jury applied improper argument)
- People v. Booker, 51 Cal.4th 141 (2011) (distinguishes permissible argument that evidence has overcome presumption from improper shifting of burden)
- People v. Cortez, Cal.4th (2016) (majority viewed an "incomplete" explanation of reasonable doubt as nonmisconduct when taken in context)
- People v. Sapp, 31 Cal.4th 240 (2003) (claims forfeited absent timely objection and request for admonition unless admonition would not cure harm)
- People v. Bonin, 46 Cal.3d 659 (1988) (presumption jurors follow court instructions)
- People v. Nguyen, 40 Cal.App.4th 28 (1995) (disapproves analogies equating reasonable doubt standard to everyday decisionmaking)