People v. Costella
11 Cal. App. 5th 1
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In Feb 2010 defendant Keith Costella shot victim Craig Kubitz, left the body in his apartment, then dumped and set the body on fire in an undeveloped lot adjacent to a highway.
- A jury convicted Costella of second degree murder (§ 187(a)) and arson of forest land (§ 451(c)), and found he personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53(d)).
- The court sentenced Costella to 40 years to life (15 years-to-life for murder + 25 years-to-life firearm enhancement) and a concurrent 2-year term for arson of forest land; however the clerk’s paperwork mistakenly showed the 2-year term as consecutive.
- Firefighters and photographs showed the immediate area around the body had bare dirt, grass, weeds, and scattered small brush; aerial photos showed much of the larger parcel was densely vegetated.
- At trial the jury asked for a definition of “brush-covered land”; the court told them to use common sense and they convicted on the arson charge.
- Defendant sought reversal of the arson conviction for insufficient evidence that the land was "forest land," and also requested a Franklin limited remand to permit making a record for a future youth offender parole hearing; the People conceded the remand issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Costella) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the burned area qualified as "forest land" ("brush-covered land") under § 450(b) for arson (§ 451(c)) | Photographs and firefighter testimony showed surrounding parcel was vegetated and included brush; substantial evidence supports that the lot was brush-covered forest land | The specific spot burned was mostly dirt with only a few weeds; defendant argued the statute requires continuous or substantial brush coverage and evidence was insufficient | Affirmed: plain meaning of "brush-covered" includes areas with scattered brush and the aerial/photos + testimony supplied substantial evidence of forest land |
| Whether a limited remand under People v. Franklin is required so defendant can make a record for a youth offender parole hearing (§ 3051) | The People conceded remand is appropriate; controlling offense (25-to-life firearm enhancement) makes defendant eligible for a 25th-year youth offender parole hearing because he was 20 at the time of the offense | Remand unnecessary if enough record already exists at sentencing | Remand ordered: court must determine if defendant had adequate opportunity to make a youth-parole record; if not, receive submissions/testimony per Franklin |
| Whether clerical sentencing documents must be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement that the 2-year arson term is concurrent | Oral pronouncement controls over minute order/abstract | Clerical entries erroneously showed the term as consecutive | Court directed nunc pro tunc correction of minute order and abstract of judgment to show the 2-year term concurrent |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (remand to permit making record for youth offender parole hearings)
- People v. Prunty, 62 Cal.4th 59 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- People v. Brown, 59 Cal.4th 86 (standard for substantial-evidence review)
- People v. Gonzalez, 43 Cal.4th 1118 (use of ordinary meaning/dictionary in statutory interpretation)
- Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.3d 785 (legislative intent and statutory construction principles)
- People v. Hooper, 181 Cal.App.3d 1174 (recognition that sagebrush/brush-covered desert falls within forest land definition)
- People v. Zackery, 147 Cal.App.4th 380 (oral pronouncement controls over clerical records)
- People v. Perez, 3 Cal.App.5th 612 (context on youth offender parole statute applicability)