2016 CO 33
Colo.2016Background
- In 2001 Corson (then 28) had a sexual relationship with K.B., a 17-year-old resident at the treatment facility where he worked; charges were filed in 2002.
- Before Corson’s 2008 guilty plea to sexual assault on a child (position of trust), the prosecutor did not disclose that K.B. had a prior juvenile adjudication for falsely reporting a sexual assault.
- Corson pled to one count in exchange for dismissal of a pattern-of-abuse count and a stipulated probationary sentence (SOISP), avoiding potential life exposure if convicted at trial.
- In 2006–07 Corson learned of K.B.’s juvenile adjudication, recanted statements by K.B. surfaced, and Corson sought post-conviction relief arguing the nondisclosure rendered his plea involuntary and counsel ineffective.
- The post-conviction court found Corson knew of K.B.’s adjudication before pleading and denied relief; the court of appeals reversed, concluding juvenile adjudications must be disclosed under Crim. P. 16 and remanding. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: held (1) no constitutional due-process right to pre-plea disclosure of non-exculpatory impeachment material here (Ruiz), (2) Corson failed to show Strickland/Hill prejudice to vacate plea, and (3) juvenile adjudications are not "criminal convictions" under Crim. P. 16 and thus are not automatically discoverable as part of a witness’s criminal history.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Corson) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether nondisclosure of K.B.’s juvenile adjudication rendered Corson’s plea involuntary (due process) | Prosecutor’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence and affirmative representation there was nothing to disclose made plea involuntary | No constitutional duty to disclose non-exculpatory impeachment evidence pre-plea; Ruiz controls | Rejected: Ruiz holds no constitutional right to pre-plea disclosure of impeachment material; plea not involuntary on that basis |
| Whether nondisclosure rendered plea counsel ineffective (Strickland/Hill) | Non-disclosure interfered with counsel’s independent decisions; but for nondisclosure Corson would have gone to trial | Even if nondisclosure occurred, Corson cannot show prejudice: record supports court’s finding Corson already knew of adjudication; other strong evidence against him; plea avoided severe exposure | Rejected: No reasonable probability Corson would have insisted on trial; no Hill prejudice established |
| Whether Crim. P. 16 requires automatic disclosure of juvenile adjudications as a witness’s "prior criminal convictions" | Juvenile adjudications are part of witness history that may negate guilt; thus rule requires disclosure | Juvenile adjudications are not criminal convictions; juvenile system separate and rule’s text does not encompass adjudications | Rejected court of appeals: juvenile adjudications are not "criminal convictions" under Crim. P. 16 and are not automatically discoverable |
| Whether post-conviction court’s factual credibility findings (knowledge of adjudication) may be disturbed | Corson challenged credibility findings as erroneous | People relied on testimony showing Corson had access to files and discussed adjudication pre-plea | Affirmed: trial court credibility findings supported by record and deferred to on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment)
- Ruiz v. United States, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (no constitutional requirement to disclose impeachment material before a plea)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (test for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice standard in guilty-plea context: reasonable probability defendant would have gone to trial)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for nondisclosed evidence under Brady)
- United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) (finality of plea and limited scope for reopening a counseled, voluntary plea)