People v. Cornejo
3 Cal. App. 5th 36
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On Jan 19, 2011, Deandre Ellison was shot and killed as he pulled into his driveway; occupants of an SUV (Jesse, Adam, Isaac) fired into Ellison’s car; Neal (backseat) returned fire with Ellison’s gun. Ellison died from a single gunshot. Adam and Isaac were shooters; Jesse drove and led police on a chase.
- All three defendants (ages 18, 17, 16 — Isaac developmentally disabled) were convicted of second-degree murder, multiple counts of attempted murder, and related offenses; jury found gang enhancements (§ 186.22(b)) and multiple firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53), including vicarious enhancements under (e)(1).
- At trial the prosecution presented gang-expert testimony tying the defendants to Norteño membership and describing two predicate crimes committed by members of other Norteño subsets; expert opined the shooting benefited the gang. Ballistics and GSR evidence linked Adam and Isaac to firing; two handguns (one recovered) and casings were found.
- Defendants raised multiple appeals: insufficiency of gang-enhancement proof (arguing subsets were not shown to be organizationally connected), evidentiary rulings (expert testimony on who fired first; exclusion of a Facebook post), jury instruction on causation, sentencing Eighth Amendment challenges for juvenile defendants (functional LWOP), and various ancillary claims.
- The Court of Appeal (Third Dist.) reversed the gang enhancements and the vicarious firearm enhancements under section 12022.53(e)(1) (because Prunty required proof of an associational/organizational connection among subsets), modified judgments, otherwise affirmed; held other claimed errors were forfeited, harmless, or without merit. The court also found the juvenile-Eighth-Amendment claim moot in light of SB 260 / People v. Franklin.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of gang-enhancement evidence (§ 186.22(b)) | Prosecution: gang expert testimony that (1) defendants were Norteños, (2) predicate crimes were committed by Norteño subset members, and (3) subsets share symbols/ beliefs, sufficed to show the crimes were gang-related. | Defendants: testimony only showed disparate local subsets calling themselves Norteños; no evidence of organizational/associational connection tying predicate-offense subsets to defendants’ subsets. | Reversed gang enhancements and related vicarious firearm enhancements. Prunty controls: prosecution must show associational/organizational connection (shared activities, collaboration, hierarchy, or behavior showing self-identification tied to the same gang). |
| Admission of expert opinion that defendants likely fired first (detectives’ testimony) | Prosecution: testimony was proper — (a) detective’s statement rehabilitated credibility after cross-examination about bias; (b) gang expert’s cultural opinion was within expertise and helpful. | Defendants: testimony invaded jury function, was speculative, and went to ultimate issue of credibility (who fired first). | Admission was proper: Detective Kirtlan’s testimony rehabilitated bias impeachment; Detective Sample’s gang-culture opinion was admissible expert evidence. |
| Exclusion of Facebook post allegedly showing victim returned to gang life (Evidence Code § 352, relevance) | Defendants: post (and profile photo) showed Ellison had resumed gang life, supporting a theory that Neal might have fired first and undermining Boyd’s testimony about motive for gun ownership. | Prosecution: foundation/hearsay concerns; admission would spin off into collateral issues and consume undue time. | Evidence not admitted; court found defendants forfeited pressing the ruling; even on the merits exclusion under § 352 not an abuse — post had minimal probative value and would require undue time. Ineffective-assistance claim failed. |
| Jury causation instruction (CALCRIM No. 520 bracketed causation language vs. CALJIC No. 3.41 given) | Defendants: trial court gave an outdated CALJIC-style instruction and omitted CALCRIM ‘‘direct, natural and probable consequence’’ language; error undermines causation standard. | Prosecution: alternative instruction covered substantial-factor causation; CALJIC wording adequate. | Although the instruction omitted preferred CALCRIM language and used the term "proximate cause," the error was harmless. Substantial-factor proximate-cause instruction given sufficed because multiple shooters could each proximately cause death. |
| Eighth Amendment challenge to juvenile sentences (functional LWOP) | Adam & Isaac: aggregate indeterminate terms (120 years-to-life + determinate terms) are the functional equivalent of LWOP; sentencing without full Miller/Caballero consideration violates Eighth Amendment. | State: SB 260 (§ 3051) grants youth-offender parole hearings by latest year 25 and, per Franklin, renders such Miller claims moot for non-excluded juveniles. | Moot: under Franklin and SB 260 the claim is moot because defendants will be eligible for youth-offender parole hearings (by 25th year); court need not order the limited remand Franklin ordered because the sentencing record already contains the juvenile-mitigation material. |
| Rule of completeness / admission of part of Isaac’s statement re: location of missing 9mm gun | Isaac: limiting testimony and not playing full statement created misleading impression and violated rule of completeness (Evid. Code § 356) and confrontation concerns. | Prosecution: limited testimony was offered to show police investigated and attempted to locate the gun; full statement not on same subject and could be misleading. | No abuse of discretion. Detective’s testimony that Isaac gave a location and police searched did not mislead; the omitted portions were not "on the same subject" under § 356 and admission of the limited content did not violate co-defendants’ confrontation rights in the record presented. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Prunty, 62 Cal.4th 59 (2015) (requires evidence of associational/organizational connection among gang subsets to support § 186.22(b) enhancements)
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016) (SB 260’s youth-offender parole scheme can render Miller claims moot for non-excluded juveniles)
- People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262 (2012) (juvenile offender cannot be denied meaningful opportunity for release; sentencing must account for youth-related mitigators)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth-related factors)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders unconstitutional; juveniles have diminished culpability)
- People v. Sanchez, 26 Cal.4th 834 (2001) (proximate causation principles: multiple actors can each proximately cause a death)