People v. Conley
63 Cal. 4th 646
| Cal. | 2016Background
- California’s original Three Strikes law (1994) imposed an indeterminate 25-years-to-life term for defendants with two prior serious/violent felonies who commit a third felony.
- Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012) narrowed when a third strike triggers a life term and created §1170.126 permitting "persons presently serving an indeterminate term" under the old law to petition for recall of sentence and resentencing unless resentencing would pose an "unreasonable risk of danger to public safety."
- Patrick Conley was sentenced to 25-to-life under the pre-2012 Three Strikes law for a DUI after the trial court denied Romero motions; his appeal was pending when Prop 36 became effective.
- Conley argued that defendants with nonfinal judgments on the effective date of the Reform Act are entitled to automatic resentencing under the Act (relying on In re Estrada), rather than having to file a §1170.126 recall petition.
- The Court of Appeal held §1170.126’s petition mechanism applied to all "persons presently serving" indeterminate terms, whether judgments were final or not; the Supreme Court granted review to resolve a split.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants sentenced before Prop 36 but with nonfinal judgments on its effective date are automatically resentenced under the new penalty scheme | Plaintiff (State) argued the Reform Act’s §1170.126 provides the exclusive mechanism for those "presently serving" and thus nonfinal judgments are not entitled to automatic resentencing | Conley argued Estrada presumption entitles defendants with nonfinal judgments to automatic application of ameliorative sentencing provisions without filing a recall petition | Held: No automatic resentencing; such defendants must petition under §1170.126 and are subject to the court’s public-safety evaluation |
| Whether Estrada’s presumption of retroactivity controls despite §1170.126 | Plaintiff: Estrada can be displaced where the enactment clearly indicates a different intent; §1170.126 functions as that indication | Conley: Estrada presumptively applies unless there is a clear contrary statement; §1170.126 does not expressly preclude automatic resentencing | Held: Estrada does not control here—§1170.126 operates as the saving/retroactivity mechanism that indicates voter intent to require petitions |
| Whether §1170.126(k) preserves an independent right to automatic resentencing for nonfinal judgments | Conley relied on subdivision (k) preserving other remedies/rights | State argued subdivision (k) does not create an entitlement to automatic resentencing and §1170.126’s text/structure forecloses that reading | Held: §1170.126(k) does not create a right to automatic resentencing; petition procedure governs |
| Practical/constitutional complications from automatic application of new pleading-and-proof disqualifiers | State: Allowing automatic resentencing would bypass prosecution’s ability to plead/prove new disqualifying factors and undermine public-safety safeguards | Conley: Automatic application is required by Estrada and avoids burdening defendants with petition procedures | Held: Court emphasized real difficulties (need for prosecutors to plead/prove disqualifiers; possible mini-trials) and saw that §1170.126 was designed to address these concerns through controlled resentencing petitions |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (Cal. 1965) (presumption that ameliorative penal statutes apply to cases not yet final absent clear contrary intent)
- People v. Pedro T., 8 Cal.4th 1041 (Cal. 1994) (courts must discern legislative intent and need not rigidly require express saving clauses where statute’s purpose indicates different operation)
- People v. Nasalga, 12 Cal.4th 784 (Cal. 1996) (clarifies limits of Estrada presumption and requirement that intent be sufficiently clear)
- People v. Romero, 13 Cal.4th 497 (Cal. 1996) (discusses trial court discretion to dismiss strike allegations)
- Teal v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.4th 595 (Cal. 2014) (explains Reform Act changed when third strike triggers life term)
- People v. Floyd, 31 Cal.4th 179 (Cal. 2003) (discusses Estrada and retroactivity principles)