People v. Comer
879 N.W.2d 306
Mich. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant pleaded guilty (2011) to first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) and first-degree home invasion; original CSC-I sentence omitted any lifetime electronic monitoring term.
- Michigan Supreme Court vacated the original CSC-I sentence and defendant was resentenced (2012); the second judgment again omitted lifetime electronic monitoring.
- The Michigan Department of Corrections notified the trial court (Jan 2013) that under prevailing appellate law the sentence should include lifetime electronic monitoring; prosecution sought correction and offered defendant options.
- Trial judge (Apr 2013) found the plea defective, gave defendant the choice to withdraw or reaffirm the plea with lifetime GPS monitoring; defendant reaffirmed and the court entered a new judgment adding lifetime electronic monitoring.
- Defendant challenged the third sentencing, arguing (1) Brantley did not mandate lifetime monitoring for all CSC-I convictions and (2) the court lacked authority to add a substantive penalty after substantial time had passed; the Court rejected both and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants convicted of CSC-I are subject to lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520b(2) | Prosecution: Brantley and later App. Ct. precedents require lifetime electronic monitoring for CSC-I (unless life without parole) | Comer: Brantley was wrongly decided; law "not settled" and monitoring should not be imposed in every CSC-I case | Held: Follow Brantley and Johnson; CSC-I convictions require lifetime electronic monitoring when sentence is not life w/o parole, so monitoring was required at original sentencing |
| Whether omission of lifetime monitoring renders the sentence invalid | Prosecution: Omitting a legislatively mandated component (per Cole) makes the judgment invalid | Comer: The omission did not authorize late substantive modification without proper motion | Held: Under Cole the monitoring term is part of the sentence; omission made the sentence invalid |
| Whether the trial court retained authority to correct the invalid sentence 20 months after sentencing without a motion | Prosecution: MCR 6.429(A) allows correction of an invalid sentence at any time; Harris controls | Comer: The court rule process and time limits should constrain postjudgment modifications; late correction improper | Held: Bound by Harris and MCR 6.429(A), the court may correct an invalid sentence without time limitation; correction affirmed |
| Whether the trial court properly used plea withdrawal/reaffirmation to effect the correction | Prosecution: Offering withdrawal or reaffirmation cured any plea defect and permitted adding monitoring | Comer: Using plea withdrawal years later circumvented MCR 6.435 and plea-withdrawal rules | Held: Court accepted reaffirmation and imposed monitoring; majority upheld procedure (concurring opinion criticized it as improper but followed Harris) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Brantley, 296 Mich. App. 546 (appellate rule adopting last-antecedent reading that CSC-I triggers lifetime monitoring)
- People v King, 297 Mich. App. 465 (criticized Brantley; called for conflict resolution)
- People v Johnson, 298 Mich. App. 128 (reiterated that MCL 750.520b(2) requires lifetime monitoring for CSC-I when not sentenced to life without parole)
- People v Cole, 491 Mich. 325 (Supreme Court: legislature intended lifetime electronic monitoring to be part of the sentence for CSC-I)
- People v Lee, 489 Mich. 289 (Supreme Court precedent governing rule interpretation cited by parties)
- People v Harris, 224 Mich. App. 597 (held trial court may correct an invalid sentence under MCR 6.429(A) without time limitation; binding on this panel)
- People v Holder, 483 Mich. 168 (explained limits on court authority to modify a valid sentence; noted DOC notices are advisory)
- People v Whalen, 412 Mich. 166 (discussed when a judge or prosecutor may be "laboring under a misconception of the law")
- People v Strong, 213 Mich. App. 107 (trial court may vacate an accepted plea only under the parameters of the court rule)