75 Cal.App.5th 276
Cal. Ct. App.2022Background
- In 1989 Clements solicited her ex-husband and her boyfriend to assault her 16‑year‑old brother; the two killed him. A jury convicted Clements of second‑degree murder in 1990 after instructions included both implied‑malice and natural‑and‑probable‑consequences (NPC) theories.
- In 2018 the Legislature enacted SB 1437, which narrowed murder liability by eliminating NPC liability and created Penal Code §1170.95 to allow certain pre‑2019 murder convictions to seek vacatur and resentencing.
- Clements petitioned under §1170.95 (2019); the trial court held an evidentiary hearing limited to the record of conviction (the parties waived new testimony).
- The trial judge issued two alternative grounds denying relief: (1) as a legal matter the record contained substantial evidence supporting a second‑degree murder conviction under an implied‑malice theory; and (2) sitting as factfinder, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements acted with implied malice.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: it held appellate opinions are part of the record of conviction for §1170.95 proceedings, rejected use of a mere substantial‑evidence test at the merits hearing (the judge must act as factfinder under the beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard), and found substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s ultimate finding of implied malice. The opinion was reconsidered in light of SB 775 but the result was reaffirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Clements) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior appellate opinion at §1170.95 hearing | Appellate opinion is part of the record of conviction and may be considered | Trial court should not rely on appellate opinion factual summary | Appellate opinions are part of the record and may be considered, but court limited reliance to trial record; later statutory amendment restricts use of appellate factual summaries |
| Proper standard/role of trial court at §1170.95(d) merits hearing | People argued record‑sufficiency (substantial evidence) showing a conviction "could" be sustained is enough | Clements argued court must make an independent factual finding that she would have been convicted under current law; substantial evidence review insufficient | Court rejects substantial‑evidence standard; trial judge must sit as factfinder and resolve whether People proved ineligibility beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Sufficiency of evidence of implied malice | People relied on the record (including Clements’ testimony) to show she knew the assault risked death and acted in conscious disregard | Clements argued reasonable doubt existed as to whether she personally acted with implied malice | Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt finding that Clements acted with implied malice; petition denied |
| Effect of later statutory amendments (SB 775 / §1170.95 changes) | People maintained amendments do not undermine factfinder standard or the denial here | Clements argued amendments narrow or alter applicable analysis and may favor relief | Amendments (including limiting reliance on appellate factual summaries) do not change outcome; court reaffirmed denial |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Woodell, 17 Cal.4th 448 (1998) (appellate opinion is part of the record of conviction for posttrial proceedings)
- People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th 248 (1996) (explains natural and probable consequences doctrine)
- People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014) (foreseeability under NPC and relationship to culpability)
- People v. Johns, 50 Cal.App.5th 46 (2020) (elements and components of implied malice)
- People v. Rodriguez, 58 Cal.App.5th 227 (2020) (rejects substantial‑evidence test for §1170.95(d) hearing)
- People v. Langi, 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (2022) (distinguishes convictions based solely on imputed malice and remands for §1170.95 hearing)
- People v. Knoller, 41 Cal.4th 139 (2007) (defines second‑degree murder and implied malice elements)
- In re W.B., 55 Cal.4th 30 (2012) (courts may presume legislative awareness of existing precedents when construing statutes)