60 Cal.App.5th 597
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- In 1989 Clements solicited her ex-husband and boyfriend to assault her 16‑year‑old brother; the two killed him. She was convicted of second‑degree murder in 1990 after jury instructions included both the natural‑and‑probable‑consequences (NPC) doctrine and implied‑malice theory.
- SB 1437 (effective Jan. 1, 2019) eliminated NPC as a basis for murder liability and added Penal Code §1170.95, permitting petitions to vacate pre‑amendment murder convictions where the petitioner could not be convicted under the amended law.
- Clements petitioned under §1170.95 arguing her conviction depended on the NPC doctrine. The parties agreed to limit evidence to the record of conviction and the trial court considered, among other materials, this court’s prior appellate opinion recounting trial facts.
- The trial judge issued alternative holdings: (1) as a legal matter the record contained substantial evidence to sustain an implied‑malice second‑degree murder theory; and (2) sitting as factfinder, the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements acted with implied malice. The petition was denied.
- On appeal the Court of Appeal held (a) an appellate opinion is part of the record of conviction and may be considered at a §1170.95 hearing, (b) the trial court must act as a factfinder at the merits hearing and apply the People’s beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt burden, and (c) substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt finding that Clements acted with implied malice, so the denial is affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Clements) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a prior appellate opinion be considered at a §1170.95 merits hearing? | Appellate opinion is part of the record of conviction and admissible in posttrial proceedings. | Trial judge erred in relying on the prior opinion; it is not part of the record for this purpose. | Held: Yes. An appellate opinion is part of the record of conviction and may be considered. |
| What standard/role must the trial judge apply at a §1170.95(d) hearing? (substantial evidence review v. factfinder) | The court may ask whether the petitioner "could" be convicted (substantial‑evidence/quasi‑appellate review). | The judge must make an independent factual finding whether the petitioner would be convicted under current law; substantial‑evidence review is insufficient. | Held: Trial judge must sit as factfinder and apply the People’s beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt burden. |
| Was the trial judge’s reliance on a substantial‑evidence legal sufficiency theory proper? | That approach (showing that a conviction "could be" sustained) is sufficient to deny relief. | Incorrect: it nullifies the statutory beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt burden and the factfinder role. | Held: Rejects substantial‑evidence approach as the exclusive method; statute requires factfinding under reasonable‑doubt standard. |
| Did the record of conviction support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements acted with implied malice? | The record (including Clements’ testimony and prior opinion) shows she solicited a violent man she knew could kill and acted with conscious disregard for life. | There is reasonable doubt that she intended or foresaw death; conviction depended on NPC doctrine. | Held: Yes. Substantial evidence supports the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements acted with implied malice; petition denial affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Woodell, 17 Cal.4th 448 (1998) (appellate opinion is generally part of the record of conviction and admissible in posttrial proceedings)
- People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th 248 (1996) (describes natural‑and‑probable‑consequences doctrine)
- People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014) (explains mens rea implications and sentencing rationale for NPC liability)
- In re W.B., 55 Cal.4th 30 (2012) (courts presume Legislature aware of preceding case law when enacting statutes)
- People v. Rodriguez, 58 Cal.App.5th 227 (2020) (contrasting authority holding substantial‑evidence standard improper at §1170.95(d) hearing)
- People v. Knoller, 41 Cal.4th 139 (2007) (defines second‑degree murder and explains implied malice components)
- People v. Cravens, 53 Cal.4th 500 (2012) (explains objective and subjective components of implied malice)