B305709
Cal. Ct. App.Dec 27, 2021Background
- Perry Terrell Clark and Javionna Starlena Richmond were convicted by a jury of human trafficking for commercial sex acts (three victims were minors); Clark was also convicted of robbing one victim. The jury found the “force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury” sentencing factor true as to two minor victims (counts 1 and 4). Sentences: Clark ~45 years-to-life; Richmond ~40 years-to-life.
- Victim evidence: Wendy (began at 14) and Lauren (16) testified Clark controlled their work, took their money, supplied drugs, physically assaulted them, and Richmond arranged ads, took calls, collected money, rented motel rooms, and transported victims. Faythe (adult) testified she worked many dates, gave all earnings to Clark/Richmond, was given meth, and felt pressured to keep working. Carly (17) was arrested during a vice operation; she later minimized Richmond/Clark’s role at trial.
- Trial instructions: court instructed on section 236.1(c)(1) (trafficking a minor) with the requirement of specific intent, then treated (c)(2) (crime involving force/fear etc.) as a separate allegation/sentencing factor and instructed that the force/fear allegation required only general intent (CALJIC 3.30 / 9.62.3–9.62.4). Defense counsel did not object to those instructions.
- Appeals raised: (1) Clark (joined by Richmond) argued instructional error—the force/fear sentencing factor requires specific intent (not merely general intent); (2) Richmond argued insufficient evidence to support the force/fear findings against her because she did not personally use force; (3) both challenged sufficiency of evidence on count 5 (trafficking of Faythe).
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: it held no authority requires the force/fear sentencing factor to carry a specific-intent element, substantial evidence supported Richmond’s aiding-and-abetting verdicts as to force/fear, and evidence was sufficient to convict on count 5.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sentencing factor that the offense "involved force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury" requires specific intent | People: The force/fear element is a separate factual sentencing allegation/enhancement that requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt but not a separate specific-intent mens rea beyond the underlying trafficking intent | Clark: The force/fear allegation requires specific intent (a facilitative nexus) to use force/coercion to effect trafficking | Court: No authority supports adding a specific-intent requirement; the specific intent to traffick is separate from the general-intent force/fear factor; any instructional error would be harmless here |
| Whether Richmond can be convicted for trafficking involving force/fear though she did not personally use force (aiding and abetting question) | People: Richmond aided/abetted—placing ads, taking calls, arranging dates, collecting money, renting rooms, standing by during assaults; jury instructions on accomplice liability were given | Richmond: She didn’t personally use force; she was tried as a direct perpetrator on the force/fear allegation and lacked requisite personal use of violence; possible duress | Court: Substantial evidence supports Richmond’s conviction under aiding-and-abetting principles; no evidence of lawful duress and accomplice instructions sufficed |
| Whether substantial evidence supports conviction on count 5 (section 236.1(a)) for Faythe (deprivation/violation of personal liberty) | People: Evidence showed sustained restriction/coercion — quotas, all earnings turned over, drug provision, threats/anger, continued work after rape — sufficient to prove deprivation with intent to obtain forced labor/services | Defendants: Faythe was already a sex worker, testified she could come and go and had access to vehicles, and there was little or no physical restraint or direct force | Court: Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, substantial evidence supports the trafficking conviction on count 5 |
| Whether the force/fear allegation must be treated as a crime-defining element rather than an enhancement (Apprendi-type concern) | People: The jury made the true finding beyond a reasonable doubt; whether labeled enhancement or alternate penalty does not change that the People bore the burden | Defendants: Characterize (c)(2) as requiring different treatment; argued concurrence/nexus instructions were required | Court: Regardless of label (enhancement/alternate penalty/aggravating factor), the jury found the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt; no additional concurrence requirement applies here |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Carrasco, 137 Cal.App.4th 1050 (Cal. Ct. App.) (trial court need not import robbery's specific-intent mens rea into a general-intent firearm enhancement; facilitative use supports enhancement)
- People v. Jones, 58 Cal.App.4th 693 (Cal. Ct. App.) (specific intent element of underlying offense is separate from a sentencing factor requiring risk or force)
- People v. Guyton, 20 Cal.App.5th 499 (Cal. Ct. App.) (harmlessness analysis and substantial-evidence support for force/fear findings)
- People v. Oliver, 54 Cal.App.5th 1084 (Cal. Ct. App.) (broad statutory definition of deprivation of personal liberty in human trafficking context)
- People v. Wardell, 162 Cal.App.4th 1484 (Cal. Ct. App.) (firearm enhancements are general-intent allegations even when attached to specific-intent crimes)
- People v. Brooks, 3 Cal.5th 1 (Cal.) (standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (any fact that increases penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt)